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This paper contributes to the literature on microfinance by examining a relatively new microfinance 
programme that was started in 1996 at the Parahyangan Catholic University Centre for Community 
Services. Most of the data for this research was collected during a three-month stay in Bandung, 
Indonesia. This stay was made possible by the Parahyangan Catholic University and the University of 
Groningen, Department of Economics.    
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their sincerity. Finally, we owe gratitude to Manto who always made time for us. For the patience and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
There is not a more visible characteristic of economic underdevelopment than poverty. It is also the 
most shocking characteristic. Poverty not only threatens the existence of many people. By taking away 
the rights of a human being to live in good health, to obtain an education and to enjoy adequate 
nutrition, poverty destroys the aspirations, hopes of the future and enjoyment as well. Although the 
world has generated significant economic growth in per capita income, its track record on poverty is 
depressing. Over the period 1975-1985 consumption per capita in developing countries grew by 32 per 
cent, and rather by another 26 per cent over the period 1985-1995. However, by fairly conservatives 
estimates the number of poor people in the world is at this time approximately one billion (World 
Development Report, 1999). Most people would agree that the reduction of poverty should be a 
fundamental goal of society.  
 
Despite these disappointing developments as far as the data on poverty is concerned, there are some 
promising new developments in the developing world. One of these is the focus of this study. Much 
excitement is based on a set of unusual financial institutions prospering in distant corners of the world 
especially in Bolivia, Bangladesh and Indonesia. Expectations were that much poverty could be 
alleviated by providing financial services to low-income households. And it has been proven that these 
expectations were not fantasies. These institutions, i.e. microfinance institutions, share the 
commitment to serve clients who were excluded by the formal banking sector and lack access to 
capital markets. Some of the programmes have primarily social missions, focusing on the outreach to 
women and measuring success in terms of poverty alleviation. Others aim to promote private sector 
activity in the face of unemployment and underemployment. As the transition economies are being 
restructured, microfinance has been put forward as a flexible tool to help individuals exploit new 
opportunities. 
 
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh has been in the vanguard of the ‘microfinance movement’, showing 
the potential to alleviate poverty by providing credit to poor households. The Grameen model 
emphasises market-based institutions that provide credit to poor households to generate new 
opportunities through self-employment. Grameen has reported repayment rates of 98 per cent and 
modest profits, while serving over two million functionally landless borrowers (Morduch, 1999). In 
accordance with the Grameen model, microfinance institutions have been established in many 
countries, for example in Bolivia, Chile, China, Ethiopia, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, the U.S., and Vietnam. In Indonesia the Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) unit system is recognised as one of the largest and most successful microfinance 
institutions in the world. 
Despite their appeal, the ability to help the poor rests on a set of propositions that must be proven 
rather than assumed in each empirical context. A lot has been written on the mechanisms that allow 
these programmes to successfully serve segments of the credit market, that commercial banks do not 
want to touch. These features include direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, use of non-
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refinancing threats, social capital, joint liability, group lending, et cetera. These mechanisms allow the 
programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers. However, once the 
mechanisms worked reasonable well, standardisation and replication became top priority, with 
continued innovation receiving only marginal attention. However, simply replication is not 
appropriate, one must imitate and adjust to the circumstances. 
 
One of the questions that naturally arises is whether the theoretical concepts apply and whether the 
mechanisms function as they are advertised. Most of the theoretical propositions are supported by 
anecdotes from particular programmes, but they have not been established as empirical regularities. 
Better research is needed to sharpen both the growing body of microfinance theory and ongoing policy 
dialogues. Empirical understanding of microfinance will also be aided by studies that quantify the 
roles of the various mechanisms in driving performance. One of the difficulties in these inquiries is 
that most programmes use the same lending model in all branches. Thus, there is no variation of which 
to estimate the efficiency of particular mechanisms. 
 
There are several reasons to be interested in qualifying the roles of these overlapping mechanisms. 
This can benefit existing microfinance institutions in their design of savings and lending products, but 
it can also give new directions for further research. Gaining a better understanding of how programmes 
work in practice is necessary for developing innovations that can help to achieve the full promise of 
microfinance in developing economies. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to give an elaborate 
description and analysis of a relatively new microfinance programme. This is done by linking adverse 
selection, moral hazard, auditing and enforcement problems, caused by asymmetric information, to the 
practice of microfinance. Further, we link the literature on outreach and financial issues related to 
sustainability to this programme. However, it is not to say that these are the only subjects that need 
research and that play an important role in microfinance.  
 
In an attempt to gain a better understanding and to shed light on the practical problems microfinance 
institutions face, we collected information on a programme that started in 1996 by the Parahyangan 
Catholic University of Bandung, Indonesia (UNPAR). At the University the Community Service 
Department Lembaga Pengabdian Kepada Masyarakat (LPKM) has been implementing 
comprehensive community development programmes. As the core activity in implementing the 
community development programme, the department facilitates the development of microfinance 
institutions. This department has been the centre of our research. 
 
The data used for this case study at LPKM were collected in the period March until July 2001 in 
Bandung, Indonesia. The data were collected by interviewing the staff of LPKM, interviewing staff 
and members of the affiliated microfinance institutions in and around Bandung, attending meetings, 
and distributing questionnaires (see Appendix A and B) to the staff and the members of the 
microfinance institutions.  
 
Data were collected by interviewing the staff of LPKM and is used to describe their microfinance 




members of these institutions provided a clear insight in the activities of these institutions. At meetings 
between LPKM and staff members of the microfinance institutions, there were again possibilities to 
interview and discuss with them. We used a questionnaire which is self administrated and 
standardised. The aim of the questionnaire was to describe and explain social phenomenon’s especially 
to retrieve data on the specific social variables, group lending methodology, repayment, screening, 
meetings, the time cost of participation, and the services provided by the microfinance institutions to 
the members. Many of the questions were semi open-ended to retrieve useful information and we tried 
to formulate the questions as easy and understandably as possible.  
 
The respondents of the questionnaires were staff members of the microfinance institutions and 
randomly selected members. The actual respondents were not disclosed to maintain anonymity, which 
was necessary to obtain accurate but sometimes sensitive information. The average number of staff 
members at the microfinance institutions is 5 and the number of members ranges from 20 members to 
over 400 members. We decided to distribute ten questionnaires to every microfinance institution, five 
for staff members and five for the members. At the moment of distributing the questionnaire, there 
were 21 microfinance institutions affiliated to LPKM. From the 21 institutions 3 had no activities at 
that moment and where therefore excluded from our research. In total we received 65 questionnaires 
from staff members and 63 questionnaires from members. The non-response was around 28 per cent. 
Due to various reasons not all distributed questionnaires were received back. For instance not all 
affiliated microfinance institutions were active at the moment of distribution, internal problems at 
microfinance institutions, the tight time schedule, et cetera made it impossible to receive back all 
questionnaires. The results of the questionnaires together with the data collected by the interviews was 
used in our research. 
 
By looking at the relatively new programme at LPKM UNPAR from another point of view, we hope 
that the results of this study can help the University to provide services on an equitable, sustainable 
and widespread basis. We would also like to accomplish a diminishing of the gap between theory and 
practice.  
 
The paper can be divided in three parts. Part one is the theoretical framework for the paper. It starts 
with defining and explaining adverse selection, moral hazard, auditing and enforcement problems, 
which will enhance the understanding of the negative effects caused by asymmetric information. This 
part also reviews the solutions used by microfinance institutions to deal with asymmetric information. 
Furthermore, the mechanisms and literature on outreach and financial issues related to financial 
sustainability is reviewed. The second part is descriptive. Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the 
Community Centre at the Parahyangan Catholic University. In chapter 4 the affiliated microfinance 
institutions are discussed. Attention is given to the affiliation of new institutions and the staff of the 
institutions. The third part gives an analysis of the programme by making use of the theoretical basis 
provided in part one of this paper: chapter 5 analysis the activities that are performed to withdraw and 
spread information to alleviate the problems caused by asymmetric information. The outreach of the 
microfinance institutions is outlined in chapter 6. The main question to be addressed is what the 
institutions do to reach their clients. It becomes clear that LPKM is more than a financial service 
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provider. A better way to address the activities is by looking at LPKM as a social service organisation. 
In chapter 7 we look at LPKM and the institutions from a financial perspective. Finally, chapter 8 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical concepts 
 
In this chapter we will pay attention to theory and empirical findings related to the topics that will also 
be addressed in the case study. The theoretical concepts we describe are the problems resulting from 
asymmetric information, outreach of the microfinance institutions, and financial issues that are often 
discussed in the modern microfinance literature. In the case study these concepts will be discussed 
again and related to the practice. The common solutions to asymmetric information will be discussed 
in section 2.2. With our empirical research we also want to illustrate practical problems that can arise 
when providing services to the poor that an ordinary commercial lender would not want as customers. 
We do not address all theoretical concepts mentioned in the literature; however this does not mean that 
such mechanisms are not important on the contrary.  
 
For many people it is hard to find a job, especially in times of economic crisis when the unemployment 
rate rises. For these people a solution to survive is to set up their own small-scale enterprise. This is 
not easy for them because they lack capital and collateral, and therefore it is almost impossible to 
obtain formal bank loans. An alternative solution is to join local co-operatives or microfinance 
institutions, where they may obtain small loans at low interest rates. These loans are based on trust and 
good business proposals, but due to a lack of financial security they are rather risky investments. 
Hence, the lack of collateral enhances the need to obtain relevant information. To decrease the risk 
microfinance institutions are searching for collateral substitutes and innovative alternatives to obtain 
information on the borrower.     
 
Microfinance programmes around the world show many different approaches in providing financial 
services to the low-income households. They are all inspired by the common thought that lending to 
the poor can be financial sustainable. These programmes were set up by trial and error. The institutions 
learned from each other and from their own experiences. However this often lead to pure imitation, 
without any attention being paid to the specific political, social and economic environment. As a result 
most programmes are not optimally designed and do not necessarily offer the most desirable financial 
products.  
 
§ 2.1 Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information refers to the uneven distribution of information among different economic 
entities. The withholding and twisting of information results in problems, which is characteristic of the 
relation between the principal and the agent. The principal and the agent act individually, in their own 
interest and with a certain degree of opportunism, in a world of asymmetric information (Bouma and 
Van Helden, 1994). Two types of informational problems are known to have significant effects. One is 
the problem of hidden information; the second is that of hidden action, often called the issue of moral 
hazard. 
 
Terms like peer pressure, social capital, non-financial sanctions, are often used in the literature. One 
MICROFINANCE DILEMMA: THE CASE OF BANDUNG, INDONESIA 
 
Wewi/RuG 12 
can easily loose track on how the various variables interact and the precise effect on the success or 
failure of these nonstandard loan contracts. We draw on the article of Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) to 
illustrate how microfinance institutions can overcome the problems of lending to the poor. Even 
though their focus is mainly on group lending and on how it can alleviate the problems of lending to 
the poor, it gives a comprehensive and systematic overview. By relating the problems with the group 
lending contracts the theoretical concepts and other mechanisms become clearer. Ghatak and Guinnane 
(1999) distinguish four major problems moneylenders are faced with due to asymmetric information. 
These problems are: 
• adverse selection; 
• moral hazard;  
• auditing costs; 
• enforcement. 
 
It has become increasingly apparent that the incompleteness and asymmetry of information between 
agents have a strong influence on market structures, the nature of economic transactions and the kind 
of contractual arrangements people enter into.  
 
One source of market failure is an imbalance of information between parties at an exchange, an 
imbalance that can be so severe that exchange is impeded. Asymmetric information can lead to 
adverse selection as well as to moral hazard. The consequence is that parties bear risk partly caused by 
chance and partly by the untrustworthiness of the contract partner who is taking advantage of his1 
“information lead”. The latter can arise in several forms. Firstly, a party can under false pretences 
persuade the other party to enter a contract. Reaching a transaction with somebody who you would 
rather not want to be your opponent and which is also determined by a form of deception, is known as 
adverse selection. Adverse selection arises in credit markets when customers have characteristics that 
are unobservable to the lender but that affects the probability of being able to repay the loan. A lender 
can solve this by assessing these characteristics or by offering loans that only good risks will accept. 
The typical method used by commercial banks, i.e. asking borrowers to pledge collateral, is not a 
realistic option, because the poor have limited supplies of tangible assets. 
Secondly, it is possible that a contract, once closed, is not performed as it should be; e.g. the agent 
goes shirking, but tries to make out like the principal belief that unforeseen circumstances are the 
cause of the unsatisfactory result. One of the parties commits a hidden action, which means a type of 
behaviour that is not listed in the contract. Usually this results in actions taken by the agent in his own 
interest and not in his client’s. This form of risk is defined as moral hazard. It concerns the probability 
of disadvantages that are a result of absence of good faith, without incontestable proof for this (Bouma 
and Van Helden, 1994). The key element is that the actions are not costlessly publicly observable. In 
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the absence of collateral there is a conflict of objectives; the borrowers do not fully internalise the cost 
of project failure.  
 
When a microfinance institutions gives a loan without security, it is even more important to audit the 
borrower. Therefore, the cost of lending for microfinance institutions are high. These institutions must 
take more measures to audit the borrower in order to secure repayment. Furthermore, it is sometimes 
very difficult for a moneylender to verify whether borrowers who say they cannot repay are indeed 
unable to do so. This is one of the many problems that result from asymmetric information.  
 
The final problem distinguished by Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) is enforcement. In rural and urban 
credit markets there is substantial risk of default: the borrower might default on interest payments and 
even part or all of the principal. This risk has many causes. First, there is the risk of involuntary 
default: owing to sheer misfortune (crop failure, unemployment, disease, death, et cetera), the 
borrower simply may not have enough money when the loan matures. Second, there is the possibility 
of voluntary or strategic default: even if the borrower has enough resources to pay the loan back, the 
borrower may take the money and run, or simply refuse to pay. In regions where the legal machinery is 
not strong or functions slowly, this is not unlikely. The enforcement problem is related with strategic 
default and arises not from informational asymmetries but from the lender’s limited ability to apply 
sanctions against a delinquent borrower. Weak legal systems, lack of securing collateral and the 
poverty of the borrower can substantially raise the enforcement costs. 
 
§ 2.2 How to deal with asymmetric information 
§ 2.2.1 Group lending 
Group lending has taken most of the spotlight and with it joint liability in order to deal with problems 
caused by asymmetric information. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) praise the innovation of group 
lending by referring to the apparent miracle of giving solvency to a community consisting almost 
entirely of insolvent individuals. Other theorists refer to the ability to deal with information and 
monitoring problems. Nevertheless, the role of group lending has been exaggerated. A paper by 
Aghion and Murdoch (1998) correctly points out that most studies have focused on the joint liability 
aspects and ignored other programme features. While it certainly has appealing features, there are 
other mechanisms that differentiate between microfinance contracts and standard loan contracts.  
 
Group lending in general refers to making loans to individuals, while the group as a whole is held 
jointly liable should repayment difficulties arise. Many, and perhaps most, microfinance programmes 





 In this study the words ‘he’ and ‘his’ can be also read as ‘her’ and ‘hers’. 
MICROFINANCE DILEMMA: THE CASE OF BANDUNG, INDONESIA 
 
Wewi/RuG 14 
According to the model, borrowers form groups of five persons. First, two members of the group get a 
loan. If they repay the loan on time, the next two get a loan, and finally the fifth gets a loan. This 
process continues as long as performance is satisfactory, but when a single member defaults all five 
members are excluded from future loans.  
 
Many of these lending programmes ask borrowers to form a group in which all borrowers are jointly 
liable for each others loan, and most micro-lenders engage in intensive monitoring of clients and rely 
heavily on the promise of repeat loans for borrowers who perform well. The positive effect is that 
successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects 
have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile. Group lending with joint liability is 
just one mechanism driving the alleviation of poverty. Until now there is little empirical evidence on 
the relative importance of joint liability as opposed to the other mechanisms. Ideally, practitioners and 
academic writers would like to identify the precise factors that contribute to the failure or success of 
microfinance institutions, since there are more mechanisms at work. The overwhelming literature on 
microfinance, focusing merely on the incentives induced by joint liability in group lending contracts, 
suggests several reasons why unconventional lenders who lend to the very poor can do so with a 
reasonable degree of financial independence and astonishing repayment rates. But until now even 
theorists and practitioners are not sure what the genuine power behind the success of group lending is. 
Is it merely the formation of groups or the use of joint liability? Or should we simply focus on the 
other mechanisms?  
To search for answers to these questions is worthwhile, particularly in light of the following evidence. 
Sadoulet (1997) argues that social collateral induced by group lending is not a sufficient condition to 
ensure high repayment rates, while Diagne (1997) points to the excessive cost of joint liability. Rai and 
Sjostrom (2000) have shown that the circumstances under which joint liability is optimal, are narrow 
and unlikely to hold in practice. Sharma and Zeller (1997) conclude that it is important for financial 
institutions to tailor services such that it becomes beneficial for the poor to establish a profitable long-
term association; without this, the joint liability would quickly show poor results. 
 
The use of joint liability can increase the performance of non-conventional lenders in some social 
context for two reasons. Firstly, members of a community may know more about each other than an 
outside institution does. Secondly, it is difficult for a financial institution to apply financial sanctions 
against poor people; as they do not have many possessions. However, the group is able to effectively 
use non-financial sanctions to discipline borrowers (loss of reputation, social isolation, restrictions on 
inputs, or physical force). The above mentioned reasons play a significant role in contracts with joint 
liability. However, gathering clients can also increase the performance of individual lending contracts 
by recognising that members can access complex and sensitive information, and by the imposition of 
sanctions (see the casestudy).  
 
Group lending and arranging regular meetings mean adverse selection by drawing on local information 
networks. The main argument is that group members can obtain information regarding the reputation, 
creditworthiness, and wealth of the loan applicant and about his efforts to ensure repayment of the loan 
at a lower cost compared to socially and physically distant bank agents. This leads to a higher 
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repayment rate and efficiency (Zeller, 1998). Group lending mitigates the problems of moral hazard by 
inducing members to influence the way other group members select their projects and their effort. 
Ghatak (1999) concludes that as long as social sanctions are effective enough or monitoring costs are 
low enough, joint liability lending will improve repayment rates through peer monitoring. Individual 
members bear liability for themselves but also for others in their group, i.e. internalisation of failure. 
As illustrated by Morduch (1999), this conclusion allows the bank to earn extra income from the joint 
liability payments, and the bank can afford to lower the interest rate. Thus, group lending increases the 
welfare and raises expected repayment rates. If the costs of auditing are too high, a contract with joint 
liability can also reduce these costs and improve efficiency. The expectation is that if group members 
face a lower cost of verifying each other’s output, the microfinance institution can avoid the cost of 
performing its own audit every time a borrower claims he has low output by inducing his partner to 
undertake liability for him. Only when the whole group states its inability to repay, the microfinance 
institution will have to incur auditing costs (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999).  
 
Social capital can also be useful to lowering these costs. Social capital provides a fund of available 
information that permits a community to interact in a way that would not be possible in an anonymous 
society. In short, person A knows what person B is doing. This gives the group members the advantage 
that they can easily and against low costs asses the reason why  borrower A declares default. Only 
when the whole group announces its inability to repay the loan, the bank has to incur auditing costs. 
Hence, audits take place less often under joint liability, and therefore the expected audit costs are 
lower and so is the interest rate. Social welfare is higher because joint liability makes lending to the 
poor possible, who are neglected by the commercial banks. 
 
While group lending has many potential benefits, there are also disadvantages. One problem is that 
attending group meetings and monitoring one’s fellow members can be very time consuming and 
therefore costly. A second problem is that the loan terms are limited by what the group feels that it can 
jointly guarantee, so members with growing businesses or new opportunities may find that the group 
contract prevents them from profiting from these opportunities. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the terms and conditions of the group no longer fulfil the demand of each group 
member in consecutive loan cycles, leading one or more members to default. Third, under some 
conditions group lending can lead to deliberate  default by borrowers that could and would repay their 
loan if they were offered an individual loan contract (Besley and Coate, 1995). Because the group is 
shut off from future credit if other group members cannot repay their instalments or if the whole group 
cannot repay, it can be beneficial for a borrower not to repay. A fourth problem is that group lending 
can be costly to implement. Evidence for this can be found in the MicroBanking Bulletin (1998), 
which shows that microfinance programmes that target the poorest borrowers generate revenues 
sufficient to cover just 70 per cent of their full cost.  
 
How well a group enforces repayment depends among other things on the degree of social and cultural 
cohesion but also on the quality of group leadership and size of the group. As Zeller (1998) notes, with 
increasing group size economies of scale, scope and risk management can be realised by the group. 
Also, the loan officer can visit larger groups more often, because unit cost per member tends to be 
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lower. However, internal management problems, co-ordination and monitoring costs can outweigh the 
benefits of forming a group if group size becomes too large. Groups beyond a certain size may 
experience difficulty of communication and co-ordinating, so that both information and monitoring 
advantages of group formation are reduced and social cohesion may be less strong. 
§ 2.2.2 Other solutions 
Besides group lending contracts there are other instruments to enforce repayment. In some 
circumstances the only sanction a microfinance institution can impose on delinquent borrowers is not 
to refinance them (dynamic incentives). Again, social cohesion (as in friendship, family ties, social 
class, ethnic groups, and neighbourhoods) can provide incentives to members to respect the loan 
agreement with the microfinance institution. The meetings between the staff and the clients are an 
instrument to build and strengthen social capital and to exploit social cohesion among members. If a 
borrower now decides not to repay the loan, even if the financed project is a success, he incurs 
sanctions from the microfinance institution but also from his fellow group members. The members can 
rely on social sanctions that reduce the attractiveness of intentional default, and accordingly repayment 
rates will be higher. Dynamic incentives can be used to enforce repayment from borrowers. The 
effectiveness of this threat depends among other things on the availability of other moneylenders and 
the willingness of members to move or to find for them. 
 
In areas with relatively low mobility dynamic incentives will work better. In urban areas, for example, 
where households come and go, it may not be easy to catch defaulters who move across town and start 
borrowing again with a clean slate at a different microfinance institution. Evidence for this can be 
found by looking at Bank Rakyat Indonesia, which has faced greater trouble securing payments in 
their urban programmes than in their rural ones, perhaps due to greater urban mobility. The spread of 
information can undo but also strengthen the effects of the mobility of clients of microfinance 
institutions. Lack of information can increase the probability of borrowers moving to other areas. In 
the informational sophisticated credit markets that prevail in industrialised countries, credit histories 
are easily tracked down on a computer; a bank or institution can easily learn about a person’s past, and 
the ability to obtain this information quickly acts as a device to discipline the borrower. Certainly, this 
is not a realistic postulate in credit markets in underdeveloped countries. The low mobility of 
borrowers can also help to explain advantages found in lending to women. At Grameen, for example, 
15.3 per cent of male borrowers missed some payments before the final due date, while this was true 
for just 1.3 per cent of the women (Khander, Khalily and Kahn, 1995). 
 
§ 2.3 Outreach  
 
The main objective of the microfinance institutions is poverty reduction, so they often wish to focus on 
the poorest segments of the population. In the field of microfinance there is much debating on whether 
access to financial services benefits “the poorest of the poor”. A study by Hulme and Mosley (1996) 
on whether microfinance is appropriate for these poorest of the poor shows that clients below the 
poverty line were worse off after borrowing than before. Their findings suggest that successful 
institutions contributing to poverty reduction are particularly effective in improving the status of the 
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middle and upper segments of the poor. By aiming too much at the poorest of the poor (and female), 
selection bias may take a negative turn. Pitt and Khandker (1998) look at the impact of group based 
credit programmes on poor households in Bangladesh. They find that poorer households are more 
likely to be borrowers than their neighbours, depending on village of residence and other observable 
characteristics. In cross-sectional studies this outreach towards the poorer households can lead to a 
downward bias on the estimated effect of credit on earnings. In extreme cases, the effective targeting 
of poor households can yield the impression that participation in the programme makes clients poorer.  
Besides serving the poor, the objective of many microfinance institutions is to empower women by 
improving their economic position in society. The public transcript of the Grameen Bank for targeting 
women is based on two objectives. First, to give women access to credit to increase their earning 
capabilities and bring improvements to the household socio-economic conditions faster. Second, to 
organise women into groups to raise their collective consciousness, strengthen their group solidarity 
though weekly meetings and assist them in attaining greater socio-economic power in society 
(Rahman, 1999). But the microfinance programmes did not begin with a focus on women. At Grameen 
in 1980-1983 women made up 39 per cent of their membership and at Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) 34 per cent were women. But by 1991-1992 at BRAC membership was 74 per 
cent female, and at Grameen it was 94 per cent female (Goetz and Gupta, 1995). How did this number 
of female members increase so quickly? The first explanation can be found it the lower mobility of 
women, which decreases moral hazard. The risk that women will take the money and run is much 
smaller than for men (Murdoch, 1999). Dynamic incentives can also help to explain advantages found 
in lending to women. Because women have fewer alternative borrowing possibilities than men, 
dynamic incentives will be increased (see subsection 5.4).  
 
The loans provided to women are not always used by the women. According to Rahman (1999), the 
loans are extended to women, but in his community study at the Grameen bank it shows that 
predominantly men use these loans and supply instalments to women for their weekly repayment in the 
loan centres. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1995) find that although 95 per cent of Grameen borrowers are 
female, in just 37 per cent of these cases do female borrowers retain significant control over use of the 
loan (Morduch, 1999). 
 
Another aspect of outreach is whether the programme serves rural or urban clients. Institutions in an 
urban area have both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of serving urban members may 
include (Morduch, 1999): 
• lower transaction cost (shorter distance to microfinance institution); 
• increased possibility that clients are literate; 
• potential higher chance of repayment, since interactions with clients can be more frequent; 
• possible leveraging through relationships with formal financial institutions, since urban clients may 
be physically closer to formal sector banks and more comfortable with visiting banks; 
• more developed local infrastructure and more varied markets.  
 
However, urban clients may be more transitory, which can result in a higher risk of potential default 
(moral hazard), character based lending may therefore be more difficult. In addition, there can be 
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covariance risk if most clients are active in the same economic sector. In the urban area more 
alternative borrowing possibilities exist, which may decrease the use of incentives that spring from not 
refinancing delinquent borrowers. 
 
But rural markets also have disadvantages: 
• there may be a long history of poorly designed rural credit programmes (with subsidised credit, no 
savings mobilisation, or credit tied to specific activities or purchases); 
• there may be a less diversified economic base; 
• covariance risk can be significant: like with agricultural lending, many farmers may grow the same 
crop, resulting in a higher risk in case of drought or other climate disorder; 
• there may be no branch or formal financial institutions in the area. This can create problems when 
clients need access to branch network for savings deposits or loan repayment; 
• it may be more difficult to reach the minimal scale required to break even; 
• there is likely to be a poorly developed infrastructure and a more dispersed population. 
 
Also many government-sponsored programmes that offer rural credit have resulted in disappointing 
performance due to their reliance on subsidised interest rates, inappropriate terms and conditions, a 
lack of repayment enforcement and corruption (Morduch, 1999). 
 
§ 2.4 Issues related to financial sustainability  
§ 2.4.1 Costs of microfinance institutions 
The practices that formal banks use to gain confidence in the quality of their loan portfolio are very 
expensive and can only be used when the size of the loan is large. They commit credit checks, 
pledging collateral and time-consuming appraisal of business plans. The high costs involved and the 
small size of the loan makes donor funds necessary. Another reason is that the microfinance 
institutions not only offer financial services but also non-financial services. These services are 
teaching the poor to manage their loans. These services will be addressed in subsection 3.3. The costs 
associated with these non-financial services are considered as social costs (sunk costs) that are needed 
to do business with the poor (social investment). These costs should be subsidised since no institution 
can offer financial services and at the same time cover these costs. This is the argumentation of 
advocates of subsidies. Yet, there are arguments used by people who tend to believe that subsidies are 
not needed and that it is possible for microfinance institutions to generate enough revenues to cover 
the cost. 
 
For a microfinance institution to stand on its own feet, it has to be financially sustainable. If a 
microfinance institution wants to be financially self-sufficient, it must cover operating costs and 
finance costs through fees and interest charges. There are many roads a microfinance institution can 
follow to recover all costs, but charging a higher interest needs more attention and research. In 
Indonesia there is a difference between commercial interest rates and the rate charged by microfinance 
institutions. So the microfinance institutions can charge a relatively high interest rate, while they are 
still attractive to poor households. Rhyne and Otero (1992) also state reasons why this can be a benefit 
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to the microfinance institutions. Moreover, it appears that clients of microfinance institutions are more 
sensitive to the availability and convenience of credit than to the interest rate (Christen, 1989). 
Research to the elasticity of credit demand is very valuable in this context. Nevertheless, there would 
be trade-offs. Borrowers will have more difficulties repaying, as a result default rates are likely to 
increase. And it can undermine the social goal of the programme. 
§ 2.4.2 Savings services   
Savings services are often not available to clients of microfinance institutions, for two main reasons. 
First, it was thought that the poor were too poor to save. Second, due to the regulatory constraints of 
most microfinance institutions, many of these are not legally allowed to mobilise deposits. However, 
recent microfinance evidence shows that even poor households want to save. Mobilising savings can 
have substantial benefits, if proper precautions are taken. In addition, there must be a suitable 
economic and political environment in the country in which a microfinance institution is active (World 
Development, 2000), because this environment influences the ability of a microfinance institution to 
offer savings services in a sustainable manner. For instance, Bank Rakyat Indonesia already offers four 
savings instruments carrying different interest rates and liquidity features. One of these is the 
SIMPEDES saving programme which is very successful, even if the interest rate is zero for small 
deposits, 0.75 per cent monthly for medium deposits and 1.25 per cent monthly for larger deposits 
(Charitonenko, Patten and Yaron, 1998). The BRI Unit Desa System in Indonesia is now fully 
financed by savings, so it is proven that collecting savings from poor clients is possible. 
§ 2.4.3 The role of subsidies and repayment 
Even large microfinance institutions such as Grameen Bank need continuous subsidies, and a recent 
survey shows that the microfinance programmes that target the poorest borrowers generate revenues 
sufficient to cover just 70 per cent of their full costs (MicroBanking Bulletin, 1998). A common 
criticism of subsidies is that it sometimes may fall in the wrong hands. Microfinance institutions that 
receive subsidised funding are less likely to effectively manage their financial performance since they 
have little or no incentive to become sustainable.  
 
A question that arises is naturally whether these subsidies should continue, since a hands-off policy is 
desirable in any market only if all other markets are working properly. There are signals that the credit 
market in transition economies has market failures, and this provides a rationale to intervene in the 
form of subsidies. Even if the credit market is functioning perfectly, subsidies may be justifiable on 
grounds of equity. Simple calculation of the costs and benefits of subsidies is very difficult, and when 
it is attempted problems may arise. All benefits and costs should be taken into consideration, but not 
all benefits and costs can be measured easily and objective. First of all there are non-pecuniary 
benefits. For example, how does one measure increased power of poor individuals, increased 
education possibilities, the presence of savings opportunities, and shifts in attitudes. Certain merits are 
hard to quantify, and to make it even more complex there are externalities. Second, extending a loan to 
a member can create benefits for another individual, the so - called spillovers. Third, Hoff and Stiglitz 
(1998) illustrate cases in which the existence of a subsidised microfinance programme worsens the 
terms and availability of loans offered by moneylenders in the formal sector.  




Microfinance discussions pay surprisingly little attention to these particular mechanisms as compared 
to how much attention is paid to purely financial matters. Attention mainly focuses on the 
determinants that influence repayment performance. Theoretical models have been developed to 
explain repayment performance of microfinance institutions, but so far empirical analysis to test them 
is extremely scant. To provide an insight into the financial status of the microfinance institution, 
repayment rates are often used. By calculating these rates, the efficiency and viability of the 
microfinance institution can be determined. These rates measure the amount of payments received 
with respect to the amount that is due. There are many ways to calculate the repayment rates of 
microfinance institutions, which makes it difficult to compare the repayment rates of different 
programmes. The reported repayment rates are often quite high, but many microfinance programmes 
are also subsidised. This leads us to the question whether the repayment rates are accurately measured 
and the role of subsidies in the calculation of the rates. Nevertheless, insight into repayment rates and 
the influence and amount of subsidies make the programmes more transparent. 
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Chapter 3 The Parahyangan Catholic University 
Centre for Community Services 
 
In Indonesia since 1995 every University is required to have a Centre for Community Services. This 
rule is enforced by the Education Department and its purpose is to make universities socially active in 
their local area by doing: research, providing basic needs to the poor, providing help to build irrigation 
systems, et cetera. The Centre for Community Services (Lembaga Pengabdian Kepada Mayarakat, 
LPKM) at the Parahyangan Catholic University (UNPAR) has been the centre of our case study2.   
 
In subsection 3.1 we will give an introduction of LPKM. Next, the vision of LPKM will be described, 
followed by the activities of LPKM. In section 3.3 the non-financial services will be addressed. 
Finally, the working environment of LPKM is described by looking at other providers of financial 
services. 
 
§ 3.1 Introduction LPKM 
 
LPKM is the co-ordinator and assistant of the creation of microfinance institutions in West Java. The 
people at LPKM give supportive facilities to the microfinance institutions, which in turn provide cheap 
loans to develop small-scale enterprises. LPKM extends loans only to the microfinance institutions and 
does not interact directly with the members of the institutions. At this moment LPKM has assisted the 
development of 21 microfinance institutions, and the total number of members of the institutions is 
around 2000 (at the end of 1998 there were eight microfinance institutions affiliated and the number of 
members was 850). LPKM raises funds from individuals in the community, state-owned enterprises, 
non-government organisations, local government and from the university in the form of a revolving 
fund amounting in total to Rp. 183,000,0003. The total loan amount outstanding at the microfinance 
institutions is approximately Rp. 175,000,000 with the loan size varying from Rp. 1,200,000 to Rp. 
61,200,000. From the data we obtained can be seen that loan sizes extended from the microfinance 
institutions to members can be as low as Rp. 100.000 and as high as Rp. 1,000,000; the average loan 
size is somewhere in the region of Rp. 835.000.   
 




 Since the focus of the research is from the perspective of LPKM and based on our own experiences we make the following 
remark: the reader is reminded to keep in mind the descriptions and regulations that refer to the relation between LPKM and 
the microfinance institutions, and between the microfinance institutions and their clients. 
3
 Exchange rate 1=Rp. 9,300 (May 2001). 
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LPKM charges a moderate interest rate to the institutions (4 per cent per year), which in turn charge a 
low interest rate to their members (2 per cent per month) and adhere to the basic principles that are 
recognisable in microfinance programmes elsewhere. The target is to assist and empower the poor in 
rural areas, as well as in urban areas. While the programme in practice tends to serve the richer clients 
of the poor, no collateral is pledged (see section 6.1). So if the members fail to repay, it is not possible 
to seize tangible assets such as livestock, land or housing to cover the cost or as a mechanism to 
enforce the agreements. LPKM and the affiliated microfinance institutions do not make use of 
eligibility criteria to exclude richer households. 
 
While microfinance institutions all over the world have something in common, generally the 
programmes have a common thread that influences the organisation and institutional aspects of the 
specific programme. However each microfinance institution has a feature that makes it markedly 
different from its colleagues. When looking at the programme initiated by LPKM, there are six 
characteristics that make its design unique and distinguish it from other programmes.  
 
First, the members who save at the microfinance institution do not receive interest. Instead, they can 
receive dividend at the end of the year with the obvious condition that the institution has yielded a 
profit. Second, interest rates on loans are fixed, independent of the intention of the loan or the 
characteristics of the borrowers. Third, the extent of co-operation between the institutions is very 
strong and will be strengthened in the future. Fourth, the design of the reward system to provide the 
appropriate incentives for the staff of the microfinance institutions. Also, the use of group lending 
contracts for large amounts is remarkable, since Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) show that 
there is evidence that this is not effective in achieving high repayment rates or in the best interest of 
the borrowers that already have growing businesses (non-starters). The final characteristic is the efforts 
and creativity of the staff of the microfinance institutions to create extra revenues. For example one 
institution is collecting garbage from people in the local area, the earnings after subtracting the cost 
will be retained at the institution and is available to borrowers. Another institution has been developed 
further; they recycle garbage and sell the output as fertiliser. An avenue that is also illustrative for the 
creativity and perseverance, is money collecting for phone bills: the staff gathers the money, transfers 
it to the phone company and receives a commission from the people in the area for this service. 
 
Besides the core activity of providing finance and training to microfinance institutions, LPKM 
participates in an action programme to protect working children and to combat and eliminate child 
labour. To this end, they co-operate with the International Labour Organisation (ILO). LPKM first 
tries to retrieve data regarding small-scale footwear businesses in Cibaduyut (a district of Bandung), to 
understand the area and to identify reasons for the use of children in the production of shoes. By 
providing training (business ethics, financial management, human resource management) LPKM tries 
to assist in the development of the small-scale footwear industry in order to reduce the use of child 
labour. Other programmes started by LPKM are housing and kampung improvement, training 
programmes for organic farming, networking with non-government organisations (NGO’s) and health 
care. These side activities will be explained in more detail in the next subsections. 
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§ 3.2 Vision of LPKM 
 
Preferential option for the poor in terms of individual, group or area, is the individual’s or group’s 
option to show solidarity and give priority to those who have not enjoyed the fruits of development, 
particularly those who are still living in poverty. Preference for the poor means that concern, special 
treatment and preference is given to people who are in need. The vision of LPKM is preferential 
option for the poor who are in need, as mentioned above, and to assist the poor to become self-
empowered (Suroso, 2001). 
 
§ 3.3 More than financial services 
 
The microfinance institutions offer their clients a variety of services, but first and foremost they offer  
financial services. However, due to the nature of the target group of the microfinance institutions, i.e. 
poor households without tangible assets and with a majority that is illiterate, they cannot operate like 
most financial institutions. Ordinary financial intermediation is not enough to induce these low-income 
individuals to participate in the programme, and therefore microfinance institutions have to offer all 
kinds of (purely) non-financial services and create mechanisms to bridge the gap created by poverty, 
remoteness, illiteracy, malnutrition. These non-financial services range from vocational, social 
nutritional to entrepreneurial education. This is typical for the social goal that microfinance institutions 
want to achieve, and also there is evidence that social intermediation makes it easier to establish 
sustainable financial relationships with the poor. 
 
From interviews with the employees at LPKM, we draw the conclusion that they view the provision of 
these social services as a process that is necessary to build the human and social capital required for 
providing effective financial services. Thus, LPKM hopes that the capacity, ability, attitude, skills and 
social capital of the staff (and members) of the microfinance institutions will develop. This will 
eventually contribute directly and indirectly to the performance of the institutions. By training and 
educating the staff of the institution the members of the microfinance institutions will also benefit. The 
microfinance institutions act as an intermediary because LPKM never provides training and education 
to the members directly.  
 
Every month LPKM organises a meeting for the staff of the microfinance institutions. During the time 
of the research not all members were present (from the 21 institutions that were invited only 13 
microfinance institutions showed up). The microfinance institutions are not forced to attend the 
meeting: no reprisals are being used when a microfinance institution does not come even when there 
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absence was not announced. This meeting is also used to collect the instalments, and to hand in the 
financial reports and business proposals for new loans.  
 
LPKM devotes a lot of resources to these meetings, they regard these meetings as an effective way to 
develop the microfinance institutions and increase the skills and confidence of new and existing 
microfinance institutions4. They are also aware that some of the microfinance institutions are not ready 
for sustainable financial intermediation without first receiving some capacity-building assistance.  
LPKM is well-aware that loan contracts cannot function unless there is a clear statement by the 
underlying social contract and a clear and well-defined mechanism to punish deviations from the 
norm. LPKM tries to design the programme in such a way that social capital (and mechanisms) is 
build, developed and sustained. Earlier we stated several manners to start this process. Besides the 
non-financial services addressed in the former subsections, three other promising programmes 
(developing health care, kampung improvement, and collaboration with the ILO) must be mentioned, 
because it is illustrative of the character of these non-traditional financial institutions. These three 
programmes will also be developed within the framework of micro credit at LPKM. 
§ 3.3.1 Health care 
LPKM is collaborating with two Catholic hospitals, that have a programme for the grassroots people. 
The idea is to set up health clinics in the vicinity of existing microfinance institutions accessible only 
for the members. Until now there are two health clinics (Kebon Pisang and Kamuning near BMW 
Bandung and LPKM, respectively). At the moment, members pay Rp. 2,000 for a consult and the 
maximum co-payment is Rp. 18,000 for medication. LPKM, BMW Bandung and sponsors provide the 
financial resources that is needed to develop the clinics. It is proposed to arrange it like an insurance 
scheme (dana sehat bersama). Members have to contribute Rp. 2,000 per month for a family consists 
of a mother, father and two children to receive benefits from it. However, this insurance scheme has to 
cope with some issues since there is a problem concerning the (lack of) social capital. Several people 
pointed out that members are afraid that they do not get the money back once they have made a 
contribution to the fund. There has to be a gradual process of members gaining confidence and trust in 
the insurance. Despite its appealing virtues, providing health care services gives rise to specific 
problems: moral hazard, adverse selection, and transactions costs. To solve some of these problems a 
health committee will be created to determine if the people are really sick and need to go to the clinic 
or hospital. 




 If the training requires the expertise that LPKM cannot (for instance agriculture), they search look for somebody who is 
capable of providing this training. 
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§ 3.3.2 ILO 
LPKM also co-operates with the International Labour Organisation. The main objective is to remove 
child labour from a hazardous working environment in the footwear sector. LPKM and the ILO will 
strengthen the entrepreneurship and develop the management capacity of employers from the footwear 
sector to achieve this objective. Workshops are organised to change and transform culture and the way 
of thinking in almost all aspects. Employers will also participate in workshops on business ethics 
related to child labour.  
§ 3.3.3 Kampung development 
With respect to their mission in order to assist the poor to become self-empowered, LPKM has 
stretched its efforts to housing for the poor. The belief is that housing can stimulate repercussion 
effects in the community. First of all, it creates jobs and working opportunities for the community. It 
directly creates jobs in the field of construction and also in construction materials, such as wood, 
bricks, et cetera. Housing and neighbourhood improvement will also involve the securing of dwellers’ 
land rights. Many people living in slums do not have proper legal documents to the land they own, 
which is also a major concern. Organising housing and kampung improvement projects will also 
improve co-operation among people in the community and help create a better atmosphere and culture. 
The microfinance institutions assist in providing loans to members who wish to improve their living 
conditions. This may involve repairing house, improving their sewage or waste system, or enabling 
people to obtain clean water, et cetera. People may also want to expand their house to accommodate 
the creation or expansion of home industry or other businesses that are run from the house, e.g. renting 
out rooms or opening up small kiosks where they sell basic goods, and providing services to customers 
in the community. 
 
While LPKM addresses many issues related to the improvement of the well-being of individuals, the 
main focus of LPKM is providing micro-credit and building and developing microfinance institutions.  
 
§ 3.4 Working environment 
 
The role of LPKM in the total microfinance industry in Indonesia is still minor. The Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia (BRI) unit system is a very successful microfinance institution in Indonesia. It is owned 
entirely by the government, but operates under all of the prudential norms and regulations that every 
commercial bank must adhere to in Indonesia. BRI’s primary mission is to provide rural and urban 
community banking services by mobilising family savings and delivering credit products to medium, 
small and micro enterprises. In 1997 BRI’s total assets were $16.7 billion, including a net loan 
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portfolio of $12.6 billion, and pre-tax profits totalled $56.7 million5. It had 324 branches that covered 
the entire country, overseas offices in Singapore, Hong Kong and New York, and a work office of 
44,000 employees (Patten, Rosengard and Johnston Jr, 2001). Besides BRI there are other 
microfinance institutions, but they often operate on a smaller scale and in a certain area or district. On 
Java, for instance, there is a sister institution of BRI, Badan Kredit Desa (BKD); it is a system of 
village-based institutions. The units are owned by villages and operated by village governments. BKD 
units are located in the rural areas of Java. There are 5,345 units, of which 4,806 were active in 1996 
(Ravicz, 1998).  
 
The black market also provides credit to the poor households. It has its own methods to attract clients. 
The black-moneylender goes from door to door to ask people if they are interested in a loan 
agreement. The rate charged by these lenders is between 15 and 40 per cent per month (compare this 
with the 2 per cent of the microfinance institutions). If clients do not repay their loan on time, physical 
force will be used. Nevertheless, it can be very tempting for people who are in financial distress. 
Usually, the loan agreement is based on trust, and no collateral is required. In one area in Bandung, 
Dago Dago Elos Area, a microfinance institution (Kopmaba) competed with the black market and they 
made an agreement that black-moneylenders would not operate in this area anymore. Another 
microfinance institution (BMW Sumedang) claims that it has difficulties repaying their loans to 
LPKM, because the black moneylenders are very active in the area. The staff of BMW Sumedang 
asserts that their members first pay the black market participants, and only when they have no more 
debts at the black market they repay the microfinance institution. However, employees at LPKM cast 
doubt on this assertion. Also because another institution, which is situated nearby, has no trouble with 
the black market and its interference.   
But if there are already so much microfinance institutions and other sources of credit, why has LPKM 
helped to create more microfinance institutions in Western Java? The microfinance institution is a vital 
factor that supports the entire economic activities in the community. Microfinance development is 
considered to be the entry point for total community development, which is the main purpose of 
LPKM. Besides, BRI and BKD only lend to the poor who are “better off” and the bank requires 
individual borrowers to put up collateral, so the very poorest are excluded (Morduch, 1999). BRI and 
BKD also provide loans that tend to be larger and they charge a higher interest, so therefore they are 
less focused on the poor. 
 
Local people ought to manage the microfinance institutions, but they often lack skills for managing 
these institutions. In the first year, 1997, LPKM began assisting microfinance institutions, by only 
providing training. Training is not only given to develop skills, but especially to facilitate change and 
development in the business attitude and behaviour. Most of the affiliated microfinance institutions 




 mid 1997 exchange rate of $1.00 = Rp. 2.450 
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only give loans and have saving facilities, but do not give training. LPKM’s first loan to an institution 
was granted after one year. The loans are not based on commercial bank requirements, but on 
character and sound business proposals.  
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4. The microfinance institutions 
 
Since the start in 1996, LPKM assists the creation of microfinance institutions in West Java, which 
provide loans for the development of small-scale enterprises. This is where LPKM has focused its 
efforts in order to alleviate the problems faced by the poor. They provide finance to microfinance 
institutions and co-operatives against a low interest rate. Furthermore, they provide training in 
organisational and accounting skills to the microfinance institutions.  
 
An institution is a group of (human, financial and other) assets combined to perform activities such as 
granting loans and taking deposits overtime (Murdoch, 1999). In April 2001 there were 21 
microfinance institutions (table 4.1) affiliated with LPKM. These institutions will be described in more 
detail in the next subsection when we look at the key characteristics. During the research period eight 
additional institutions applied to become affiliated with LPKM. The application procedure and the 
problems new institutions face when they first start with their activities will also be discussed in the 
following subsections. LPKM has strict criteria and information requirements for new institutions to 
combat moral hazard and adverse selection. On their turn the microfinance institutions in turn have 
rules concerning the acceptance of members to avoid the problems discussed in chapter 2. 
 
§ 4.1 Strong microfinance institution 
 
According to Morduch (1999) a good microfinance institution has three attributes. First, it must 
provide services to the relevant target group. Second, the activities and offered services must also not 
only be demanded but also have some identifiable positive impact on the lives of customers. Third, a 
good institution is strong, financially sound and stable. In a more comprehensive study by Fruman and 
Isern (1996), seven key characteristics of a strong microfinance institution are distinguished. The 
seven key areas, which are used to provide more insight into the strength of the affiliated institutions, 
are: 
1. vision; 
2. financial services and delivery methods; 
3. organisational structure and human resources; 
4. administration and finance; 
5. management information system; 
6. institutional viability; and 
7. outreach and financial sustainability. 
 
A mission statement is a characteristic of the first key area - vision. This statement must define the 
target market and services offered, and management and staff must endorse it. LPKM clearly has a 
well-defined vision (mentioned in chapter 3) which is adopted by the affiliated microfinance 
institutions. The reward system, which will be described in subsection 4.4, for staff members of an 
institution depends on the performance of the institution itself. This reward system makes the staff 
members very strongly committed to pursuing the institution to become a profitable niche (in terms of 
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people and funds). Strong commitment by the staff provides a positive contribution to the strength of 
the microfinance institution. The third characteristic is a business plan, stating how to reach specific 
strategic objectives in three to five years. For the affiliated institutions it is very difficult to make such 
a business plan, because the activities are risky and much depends on the willingness of its members. 
However, LPKM makes a business plan with (for instance) objectives for the future together with or 
for the institutions.  
 
The second key area, financial services and delivery methods, is characterised by the adoption of 
simple financial services to the local context and the clients. The institutions try to listen to their 
members in order to provide services they appreciate. By organising special meetings to its members, 
the staff is open to new ideas and suggestions to improve the institution. Another characteristic is 
decentralisation of client selection and financial service delivery. All affiliated institutions make their 
own decisions when they accept new members and grant loans to their members. Also for the provided 
services LPKM only gives advice. The chief or staff of the institution makes the final decision. 
 
A characteristic of the third key area - organisational structures and human resources - is the use of 
accurate job descriptions and relevant training. Even though at every institution there is a clear 
distinction between the functions of the staff, they often have to do activities that are not in line with 
their job description. This is sometimes due to lack of number of staff members or lack of skills. The 
data from the staff members of the institutions shows that 36 per cent of the difficulties in the past had 
to do with staff members of the institution. For instance, bad co-operation between members of the 
staff and lack of skills, are two problems often observed. Loan enforcement seems to be a huge 
problem, especially when starting microfinance institutions, who face too many bad repayments and 
bad discipline from their members (23 per cent), according to staff members of the institutions. 
Secondly, the new institutions lack funds (13 per cent), and thirdly, their own administration is poor 
(12 per cent)6. To improve skills of the staff and alleviate the problems of new institutions, the staff 
receives training provided by LPKM. The training, such as book-keeping and entrepreneurship 
training, is focused on their work at the institution. In addition, a strong institution must have 
appropriate performance-based incentives offered to the staff. The reward system, as described in more 
detail in subsection 4.4, provides a very good incentive to the staff. 
 
Fourthly, administration and finance is characterised by standardised activities and its understanding 
by the staff. Even though many administrative activities are standardised, almost all members need 
special treatment. Every member has its own loan agreement with a specific loan amount and specific 




 An anecdote from one of the staff members tells  that they there where problems with the opening hours of their institution. 
They came to LPKM to complain that it took a lot of time to run the institution. It turned out that they were open all the time 
and therefore there was never time to rest. LPKM advised the staff of the microfinance institution that it is better to have 
fixed opening times.  
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terms. Other administrative activities such as member and loan application are standardised. Also 
internal and external audits carried out at regular intervals contribute to the strength of the institution. 
Every microfinance institution is obligated to hand in a financial report monthly, which is audited by 
LPKM and employees and students of the Department of Economics.  
 
The fifth key area is the management information system. This system is to provide timely and 
accurate information on key indicators that are most relevant to operations and are regularly used by 
staff and management in monitoring and guiding operations.  
 
Microfinance information systems generally fall into three main areas (Morduch, 1999). First, an 
accounting system with the general ledger as its core. Second, a credit and savings monitoring system, 
which captures information and provides reports on the performance of each granted loan, often with a 
savings system that monitors all transactions related to member savings. The institutions affiliated with 
LPKM do not use an automatic credit and savings monitoring system, but they record all credits and 
savings and these data are monitored by staff and at some institutions also by the credit team. Also all 
the institutions have to hand in a financial report with the general ledgers, they also have to deliver a 
yearly report, Rapat Angota Tahunan (RAT), to LPKM. This report contains among others things 
information concerning outstanding loans, profit, and the total number of members. Third,  
information systems as distinguished by Morduch (1999) is a system designed to collect data on client 
impact. Even though the data from the staff shows that they collect data on the impact of the 
programme, generally the data is gathered only in an informal manner and not systematically recorded. 
Data gathered by the staff concerns increased income of the members and increased business skills, 
such as book-keeping or management (both 37 per cent). From the staff respondents, 21 per cent 
claims that they gather information about the investments in the business of the member, and 18 per 
cent gathers information on the children of the members: whether they receive more education and 
nutrition.    
Legal registration and compliance with supervisory requirements is the main characteristic of the sixth 
area, i.e. institutional viability. All microfinance institutions want to have a legal registration to 
become a legal form. This legal form makes the institution appear trustworthy to potential members 
and it improves the viability. From the affiliated institutions thirteen institutions have a legal form, 
shown in table 4.1.   
 
The last (and seventh) key area of a strong microfinance institution is outreach and financial 
sustainability. Financial performance will be dealt with in chapter 7. It is characterised by achievement 
of significant scale, including a large number of underserved clients (for example, the poor and the 
women). As can be seen in table 4.1, the number of members of the institutions ranges from 20 
(minimum requirement) t0 426. Chapter 6 contains more information on the members served by the 
microfinance institutions.  
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Table 4.1: Microfinance Institutions 
Institution Date established Setting Number of members Legal form 
1. BMW Bandung March 1997 Urban 225 Yes 
2. Kopmaba July 1997 Urban 217 Yes 
3. Anugerah November 1997 Urban 69 No 
4. Mitra Sejahtera  February 1998 Urban 231 No 
5. Mitra Umat No activities Urban 30 No 
6. Mitra Mandiri March 2000 Urban 88 Yes 
7. Mitra Wargi Saluyu November 2000 Urban 32 Yes 
8. Surya Mandiri July 1999 Urban 20 Yes 
9. Dulang Perak November 2000 Urban 23 Yes 
10. Multi Usaha  November 1998 Urban N A Yes 
11. Setia Kawan November 2000 Urban N A No 
12. Tatali Wargi January 1995 Urban 426 Yes 
13. Mega Prima February 1999 Urban 56 Yes 
14. Paguyuban Warga July 1983 Urban 60 No 
15. Koprima  November 2000  Urban 22 No 
16. Cibangkong Sebelas November 1998 Urban 179 No 
17. BMW Sumadang July 1998 Rural 102 Yes 
18. Batulonceng May 1998 Rural 30 No 
19. Nurul Amal  April 1998 Rural 62 Yes 
20. Kowardes Berkah November 1999 Rural 36 Yes 
21. Baruna Siribon February 2001 Rural N A Yes 
Source: LPKM 
 
§ 4.2 The entrance of new institutions 
 
As mentioned before in April 2001 there were 21 microfinance institutions affiliated with LPKM, but 
in less than four months this number increased with more then one third: to 29 institutions at the 
beginning of July 2001. Through all kinds of ways, starting or already existing institutions contact 
LPKM. New institutions sometimes simply apply at a training or LPKM receives a letter with a 
proposal to become a member.  
 
When a microfinance institution wants to become affiliated to LPKM, it must meet certain 
requirements7. The first requirement is that it must provide data to LPKM. These data consist mainly 




 The staff at LPKM is relatively strict in the rules they apply; by being so and also by maintaining a good database they 
prevent that the money falls in the wrong hands. 
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of personal information on its members, the activities and services the institution provides, capital and 
background information of all staff members of the institution. The microfinance institutions must also 
deliver a monthly financial report to LPKM (balance sheet and income statement). To monitor the 
microfinance institutions, but also to give information on whether the staff needs help accounting. At 
the end of each year all microfinance institutions have to present a report called RAT (Rapat Angota 
Tahunan). When a new institution is approved, it has to introduce itself at a meeting, but often 
everybody already knows about the existence of the new institution.  
 
In the future every new microfinance institution needs a recommendation by at least three other 
microfinance institutions before the admission is approved. The three existing institutions judge the 
new institution by looking at the skills, motivation and seriousness of staff members. In addition, the 
business proposal will be scrutinised. In case the ‘new’ institution does not repay the loan, the three 
microfinance institutions recommended the newcomer are held responsible. The sanction does not 
mean that the three microfinance institutions need to pay the loan back, but they will be excluded from 
future loans. LPKM welcomes this initiative because there is simply not enough money to redistribute. 
Therefore the recommendation letter is perceived as an effective selection criteria; also it shows that 
the other microfinance institutions are partly responsible.  
 
A rational problem that will arise as a result of this new rule, is that the microfinance institutions will 
be somewhat reluctant to give a letter of recommendation to new microfinance institutions. Hence, 
when there are more microfinance institutions eligible for a loan, this will mean that there is less 
money available for each individual institutions. This problem is enhanced by strong signals that point 
out that LPKM has a limited amount of money. Whether this new procedure will make existing 
institutions reluctant has to be awaited. Furthermore, this influences the extent of co-operation and 
dependence between the microfinance institutions, which distinguishes it from other microfinance 
programmes.  
 
§ 4.3 Staff of microfinance institutions 
 
The Indonesian law obligates microfinance institutions to have a minimum staff of three people: chief, 
secretary and treasurer (see also subsection 4.6). The members of the institution elect the chief of the 
institution. In practice however, three persons are not enough to run a microfinance institution 
properly. For the affiliated institutions the average number of staff members is five. Every institution 
also has an advisor. This advisor does not deal with daily activities but gives advice on how to deal 
with certain problems and the management of the institution. The advisor can be a formal or informal 
leader or a member. For instance, the advisor of three institutions (BMW Bandung, Mitra Sejahtera 
and Kopmaba) is the head of LPKM, Mr. P.C. Suroso. 
 
Later on, a creditor team can be formed to assist the staff of the institution. At this moment there are 
four institutions (Kopmaba, Tatali Warga, Mitra Sejahtera, and BMW Bandung) that have a creditor 
team. In the future LPKM wants every affiliated microfinance institution to have a creditor team. This 
team consists of three people, who can be members of the institution. They report on the business 
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proposals from members to the chief of the institution. The decision for granting a loan is not solely 
based on the opinion of the credit team; their opinion is only taken into consideration. The creditor 
team also monitors the loans to members and reports when a member is late with his repayment and 
asks the staff to visit him. Other activities of the creditor team are identifying the purpose of the loan, 
monitoring some of the small-scale entrepreneurs and crosschecking friends of the members to see 
whether the loan is used according to the proposal.   
 
§ 4.4 Reward for the staff 
 
As mentioned before, one of the striking differences with the organisation of other microfinance 
institutions is the arrangement concerning the remuneration of the staff of these microfinance 
institutions. All the institutions are independent, so if they make more profit, there is more money to 
pay salaries and the to distribute money in the form of loans. A well-designed incentive scheme 
rewards staff behaviour that benefits the microfinance institution and punishes behaviour that results in 
increased risk or a loss to the institution. Therefore, it is crucial that LPKM understands what type of 
behaviour will lead to which results, so that it can help to design an incentive scheme in such a way 
that the microfinance institutions’ productivity and profitability increases. It is also important to bear 
in mind the effect different incentive schemes will have on clients and their needs. Moreover, one 
should not overlook the influences of the reward system on the morale of the staff drawn in by the 
programme’s social mission, which can lead to management challenges. These are issues that certainly 
need more attention, when the institutions are more established. 
 
At an institution all staff members start as volunteers. Table 4.2 shows that, 53 per cent of the staff 
members receives no salary. From these people, 22 per cent works voluntarily at the microfinance 
institution, but none of them would like to continue working voluntarily. Normally, staff receives only 
a salary when the institution starts collect interest, which can take more than six months. But often the 
staff receives a salary after three or four months. Table 4.2 shows that this salary mainly depends on 
the performance of the institution, and 68 per cent of the respondents would like to be rewarded like in 
that form. 
 
The salaries are paid by the instalments, but only after all expenditures and loan repayments to LPKM 
have been made. The institutions make use of the so-called targeting system: if the staff members do 
not collect the instalments, they do not receive a salary. Sometimes when a microfinance institution 
after a long period still cannot pay a salary to its staff, LPKM or Mr. P.C. Suroso will pay the salary. 
This is done to make the institution financial stable. When an institution makes a profit and is able to 
pay a salary, it is free to decide what amount they should be paid as a salary. LPKM advices on the 
height of the salaries. Until now there have been no real problems with the payment of salaries.  
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Table 4.2  Reward for staff of microfinance institution 
(1) How are you rewarded for your work at the microfinance institute?  (%) 
No salary, but voluntary  22 
No salary, but in the future I will receive a fixed salary 6 
No salary, but in the future I will receive a salary  25 
Salary based on the performance of my institute 0 
Fixed salary plus based on the performance of my microfinance institution 29 
Salary based on performance of my microfinance institute 13 
Other  5 
(2) How would you like to be rewarded for your work at the microfinance institute? (%) 
No salary, but voluntary 0 
No salary, but in the future I would like to receive a fixed salary 
No salary but in the future I would like to receive a salary   
Based on the performance of my institute 
Fixed salary 








(3) How many hours a week do you work at the microfinance institute?  (%) 
Between 0 and 8 hours 
Between 9 and 16 hours 
Between 17 and 24 hours 
Between 25 and 32 hours 
Between 33 and 40 hours 
Between 41 and 48 hours 








Respondents: 65 staff members 
 
The salaries of course also depend on the hours worked at the institution. Not many staff members 
work full-time at the institution; often they have another job somewhere else. The table shows that 61 
per cent works less than eight hours at the microfinance institution and only 9 per cent works more 
than 41 hours.  
 
§ 4.5 New members 
 
This section explains the procedures and the requirements to become a member of a   microfinance 
institution. Chapter 6 deals with the outreach of the microfinance institutions, while in this subsection 
the general application procedure is addressed. When somebody wants to become a member of a 
microfinance institution he or she has to announce this at the institution. From the respondents 34 per 
cent find out about the institution from his friends or neighbours and 30 per cent directly from the staff 
of the institution. In a preliminary conversation the staff often explains the process of application and 
the activities of the microfinance institution briefly. The applicant has to fill in an application form 
(Formulir Keanggotaan), stating his name, date of birth, address, occupation, area of occupation, 
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salary, education, skills, work experience, and the reason for applying. The most common reason 
people apply is because they need a loan (36 per cent). The low interest rate is the second reason 
people want to become a member of an institution (see table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Members 
(1) How did you find out about microfinance institution  (%) 
From friends  23 
From staff visited my house  16 
Went to institution and asked the staff 14 
From neighbours  11 
Asked around 9 
From other members 7 
Through mass media (radio/television) 7 
From family  5 
Through meeting/training from microfinance institution 5 
From chief of area 2 
Through other organisation 2 
(2) Reason applied  (%) 
Needed the loan 36 
Low interest rate on loan 34 
Training at institution  16 
Could not get loan elsewhere 6 
Social activities 4 
Other  5 
(3) Intended purpose of the loan  (%) 
To run the existing business 34 
To grow and to expand the existing business 32 
For expenditure related to family 14 
To start for the first time a business 12 
For medical expenses 4 
For an emergency 3 
For social ceremonies  1 
Respondents: 63 members 
 
The Pengurus (chief, secretary and treasurer of the institution), at some institutions together with the 
creditor team, checks all the provided data. The Pengurus also checks whether the applicant is not a 
member of another institution or has outstanding loans somewhere else. However, it is quite difficult 
to check whether people have outstanding loans at other moneylenders. Much of the analysis of the 
new member is based on trust and interpretation by the Pengurus, because according to the 
respondents 23 per cent of the staff members looks how serious and motivated the new member is. 
Moreover, the Pengurus asks the member whether he will obey the rules, and the institution makes a 
business analysis (done by both 11 per cent from the staff respondents). Also non-measurable factors 
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such as the character of the applicant and his honesty are factors influencing the decision of allowing 
the applicant to become a member. Besides this, the opinion of other members (4 per cent), colleagues 
(2 per cent) and neighbours (2 per cent) are considered in the decision.  
 
When a new member has been analyzed, the staff notifies him. To become a member he has to pay a 
one-time entrance fee of Rp. 5,000-10,000 administration costs. In return the new member receives a 
bankbook in which his loan status and savings are recorded. After three months the new member can 
apply for a loan, because first he has to save at the institution. The factors taken into consideration 
before granting a loan are: business proposal (34 per cent), knowledge of the new member (24 per 
cent), opinion of other members (19 per cent) and opinion of neighbours (11 per cent). 
 
§ 4.6 Procedures for microfinance institution to get a loan 
 
This section outlines the procedures for the microfinance institutions to get a loan from LPKM and the 
requirements the members have to meet before becoming eligible for a loan. Financial intermediation 
is one of the categories of services provided by LPKM and their micro enterprises; the social services 
were described in section 3.3. This description will shed light on the more important parts of this paper 
and the implications of these procedures.  
 
Every existing microfinance can go to the training provided by LPKM, but in order to be eligible for a 
loan the microfinance institution has to meet the following six requirements: 
1. have at least 20 members; 
2. have at least three staff members; 
3. have an office address; 
4. have a financial report; 
5. build capital; 
6. must exist for at least three months. 
 
First, every microfinance institutions must have a minimum of twenty members. These members do 
not necessarily have to be borrowers or savers, they just have to be members. Second, the staff of the 
microfinance institution has to consist of three people: a chief, secretary and a treasurer. These two 
obligations are government rules or guidelines. Third, the institution must have a fixed office address. 
Fourth, the institution must hand in a financial report every month to LPKM. Fifth, the institution must 
build some capital and the last requirement is that the institution must exist for at least three months in 
order to build capital, before LPKM extends a loan. The precise amount of required capital depends on 
the total amount of savings and the number of borrowers. There is no government regulation 
concerning the minimum capital requirements. The standard path to raise capital is to collect savings 
of potential borrowers. It is possible to get a second loan while there is still a loan outstanding, 
however this procedure does not apply to the first loan granted to a microfinance institution.  
 
LPKM only grants loans to the microfinance institutions, which are responsible for returning the 
interest and principal. The annual interest rate LPKM charges is four per cent nowadays. In the past 
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LPKM had different interest rates for different loan amounts. For loans between Rp. 0–10,000,000 the 
interest rate was 6 or 8 per cent. The precise rate depends on the negotiations and the financial 
performance of the microfinance institutions. If the loan extended is larger than Rp. 10,000,000 the 
interest rate drops to 4 per cent. The LPKM employee rationalised this by saying that otherwise the 
interest payment is too much of a burden on the financial position of the microfinance institutions. 
Loan repayments must be made on a monthly basis. In general the loan term is between one and three 
years, depending on the negotiations and whether or not the microfinance institution thinks it will be 
able to pay back the loan. The loan amount is normally not bigger than Rp. 2,000,000. This amount 
can only be bigger, if the microfinance institution has a good reputation and solid financial reports, but 
the loan term cannot be longer than three years. The loanterms and amounts are unilaterally set by 
LPKM.  
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Chapter 5 Asymmetric information 
 
In the literature much attention is paid to group lending to alleviate the problems caused by 
asymmetric information. In line with the literature (as described in chapter 2), we focus on the use of 
group lending mechanisms among other things. This is however not the only mechanism that is 
available to make borrowing to people who are excluded by formal banks a success. LPKM uses 
regular meetings (section 5.2 and 5.3), dynamic incentives (section 5.4) and progressive lending to 
deal with the problems caused by asymmetric information.   
 
§ 5.1 Group lending 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, group lending contracts generate several benefits. There are mechanisms at 
work that allow these programmes to generate high repayment rates from low-income borrowers 
without requiring collateral. However, not every microfinance institution makes use of group lending 
contracts that feature joint liability. For example, new programmes in Russia and Eastern Europe have 
demonstrated the advantages of employing individual-based contracts instead of using only group 
lending contracts. Also, Bank Rakyat Indonesia does not use group lending mechanisms. And, unlike 
many other microfinance programmes, the BRI requires the individual borrowers to pledge collateral. 
As a result, the poorest borrowers are excluded. The microfinance institutions affiliated with LPKM 
make incidental use of group lending contracts. Most of the programme is based on individual 
contracts, with individual liability. 
§ 5.1.1 Group lending by the microfinance institutions 
Group lending contracts only occur at three microfinance institutions: BMW Bandung, Kopmaba and 
Cibangkong Sebelas. The size of the first loans provided by the microfinance institutions to their 
members is often small. When the borrowers have proven their creditworthiness and have established a 
long-term relation, the actual amount they can borrow may become bigger. If a borrower applies for a 
loan that is more than Rp. 15,000,000, the member is obligated to form a group that consists of at least 
five members. This principle is the opposite of many other programmes elsewhere, since in general 
members have to form groups in order to get a “small” amount of capital. This rule can withhold 
wealthier borrowers. Therefore, Bancosol and the Grameen Bank have abandoned group lending and 
now use individual loan contracts for their richer and most-established borrowers. The group lending 
contracts are especially used for becak drivers (paddlecab drivers) and farmers. This will be discussed 
in more detail in subsections 5.1.4 and 5.1.5.  
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§ 5.1.2 Group formation  
In short, the use of group lending potentially works better than other financial contracts, because group 
members have superior information on one another and can impose non-financial sanctions on one 
another. Should the group be initiated by the microfinance institutions or can the members form their 
own group? It appears that screening is more effective within groups that are formed by their own than 
within those groups that depend interference by the institution. The degree to which group members 
know each other and interact on a regular basis is of importance in this context. When potential 
members do not know each other initially, it would take considerable time for people to perceive just 
how honest and trustworthy others are in related group lending contracts. Hence, group formation is a 
critical component of successful group lending. The process of the formation of groups influences the 
structure of the group and therefore conditions its consequent conduct and performance, along with the 
characteristics of the programme and the group’s community. We do not attempt to model the stages 
that lead to the formation of groups or the consequences of the final outcome of this process on the 
repayment performance. 
 
The meetings between the staff of the microfinance institutions and their members can function and do 
function as a means to learn more about the other (group) members and they help to increase group 
solidarity. As is shown in  table 5.1, in most cases the members can choose their other group partners 
themselves, and usually they form groups with friends. Therefore, it seldom happens that they do not 
know their other group members well. According to the data from the members of the institutions, the 
other members of their group are friends (64 per cent), relatives (29 per cent) or neighbours (7 per 
cent). This is because in 92 per cent of the cases the people can choose the other group members 
themselves. Members are very careful about whom they admit into their group, given the threat of 
losing access to future credit or the possibility of having to pay off someone else’s loan with their own 
savings. Hence, rules concerning group formation are a crucial component of successful group 
lending.   
 
The loans are made to the individual borrower, but the group as a whole is responsible for loan 
repayment. The rule states that if one member of the group ever defaults, all others in the group are 
denied subsequent loans. This rule is initiated by LPKM and is used by all affiliated microfinance 
institutions. Because of this rule, most members (62 per cent) responded, chose the other group 
members mainly on the basis of their good reputation (creditworthy and character of the member). 
When group members are involved in the same economic activity, the cost of monitoring can decrease. 
While this argument appears to be justified, there are circumstances in which this is not the case. The 
ability to obtain relevant information on others does not solely depend on the homogeneity in 
occupation. There are more ways to gather information. While it is too early to asses the success of 
group lending using this methodology in this particular context, an open mind to allow groups to be 
formed voluntarily among different professions is valuable, thus paying attention to the factors that 
influence access to information and the way information is transmitted in the social system of 
Indonesia.  
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Table 5.1  Group formation 
(1) With who did you form a group to get a loan?  (%)  
Friends 64  
Relatives 29  
Neighbours 7  
(2) Could you choose the other group members?   
Yes 92  
No 8  
(3) If you chose the other members, why did you choose those people?    
They have a good reputation 62  
We get along well 13  
We are neighbours 11  
Others have specific skills for occupation 7  
Group formation is based on where they live 7  
Respondents: 63 members 
 
§ 5.1.3 Group arrangements 
From the group members 92 per cent responded that their group often meets and has formulated rules 
(table 5.2). The most important rule (42 per cent) between members of a group is that everyone must 
pay the instalments on time. Other rules made are less easy to enforce and more informal, like 
agreements about honesty, discipline and trust. Besides rules, all groups have constructed a savings 
scheme. An example of a savings scheme will be given in subsection 5.1.4. 
In a group lending contract only 8 per cent of the participants never had a late repayment. This is very 
low and indicates a relative bad performance of the group. However, in most cases when a group 
member had difficulties the group as a whole (75 per cent) offered help to the member (see table 5.2). 
Second, a person of the group (17 per cent) and third the respondent himself (8 per cent) offered help 
to the member in need. According to the respondents the help offered to the group member who had 
difficulties repaying the instalment, was mainly financial; sometimes business support was offered (see 
table 5.2) - probably because many of the group members are in the same economic activity. Due to 
the joint liability of the group, the obligation to help the group member in need is very high. Table 5.2 
also shows that participants monitor other group members well. Often, the group as a whole (in 60 per 
cent of the cases) or an individual of the group (26 per cent) addressed the group member with the 
problem. 
 
Besides the sanctions for the group as a whole, the group itself has sanctions for the group members. 
For instance, a reminder and a fine will be given to the member that repays late, and in the worst case 
the group as a whole can dismiss a member to avoid further problems.  
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Table 5.2  Group arrangements 
(1) Does your group meet regularly?  (%)   
Yes 92   
No 8   
(2) Did your group make rules?   (%)  
Yes 92   
No 8   
(3) What kind of rules are these? (%)   
Repay loan on time 42   
Be honest 17   
Save 8   
Be disciplined  8   
Trust each other 8   
Follow rules of institution 8   
Informal agreements  8   
(4) Does your group have a savings scheme?  (%)   
Yes 100   
No 0   
(5) Was there any member in your group who had problems 
repaying his instalment?  
(%) 
Yes 92   
No 8   
(6) Did he receive any help?  (%)  
From the group as a whole 75   
From somebody else from the group  17   
From myself 8   
(7) What kind of help was offered to the person?  (%)   
Financial  83   
Business  17   
(8) Who addressed the person of the group when he could not pay 
the instalment?  
(%) 
The group as a whole 60   
Myself 13   
Somebody else from the group 13   
The chief of the microfinance institution 7   
The staff of the microfinance institution 7   
Respondents: 63 members 
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§ 5.1.4 Group lending for becak drivers 
An exception to the rule that a group has to be formed for amounts over Rp. 15,000,000, are the loans 
provided to becak drivers. The becak drivers also have to form a group for loans less than this amount. 
The loan amount for the becak drivers is somewhere around Rp. 2,500,000 and the loan term is 
approximately eighteen months. The loans to the becak drivers give them the opportunity to buy their 
own becak. The staff of the institution not only grants the loan, but also accompanies the borrowers to 
buy the assets. There is a mutual benefit to this: the staff ensures that the borrowers do not use the 
money for other activities (for instance, gambling), and the borrowers are sure that they pay a normal 
price for the becak. Thus, there is a controlling process from both sides. When the becak drivers repay 
all the instalments, the becak becomes theirs. At this moment the becak drivers rent their becak, but 
they will never have their own. By giving them the opportunity to become the owner of the becak 
gives them selfesteem and more incentives to work.  
One of the reasons for the microfinance institutions to use group lending for becak drivers is because 
they are regarded as very risky borrowers. By making use of group lending, the cost of screening, 
monitoring and enforcement are to a large extent transferred to the group members. This makes it 
possible for the institution to reach more members and also the more risky clients, even in the face of 
asymmetric information. Especially the becakdrivers have excellent knowledge about who is a reliable 
creditor and who is not. They spend all day together, and therefore they are very capable of choosing 
the other group members.  
 
A big difference with other microfinance programmes is that the institutions charge the same interest 
to becak drivers as they do to other borrowers, while the becak drivers belong to a category that can be 
considered as very risky: the becak drivers work on the streets all day and often have to wait long for a 
customer, so in their spare time they like to gamble. This is one of the reasons why they have to pay 
the instalments every day. Every day the group members have to pay Rp. 2,000, from this Rp. 1,500 is 
interest and principal, and the remaining Rp. 500 is the amount they have to save each day. This 
amount is quite a burden for the becak drivers, since their daily income usually is between Rp. 4,000 
and 10,000.  
§ 5.1.5 Group lending for farmers   
Another group lending system, only used by the microfinance institution Kopmaba, is for buying a 
cow. Members could sign in if they were interested in a loan, that can be used only to buy a cow. 17 
members in total were interested, but because the price of one cow is approximately Rp. 3,000,000 and 
the funds of the microfinance institution are limited, the staff of Kopmaba and LPKM tried to look for 
a solution that would benefit as many members as possible. They came up with the idea to form one 
large group of these 17 members. There was only money to provide a loan to three members. The 
decision was made to let a lottery pick the families who would get the first loans. The other group 
members would receive a loan after the first members successfully repaid their loans. At worst, they 
had to wait several years for a loan, but all group members agreed with the lottery. The term of the 
loans was three years and the instalment was Rp. 1,000,000 per year. After one year, when the three 
members repaid their instalments, a new loan to buy a cow could be granted to another group member. 
The cow is an individual asset, and the loan is provided to an individual. To repay the loan the 
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members can use the revenues from the sale of young cows and other products. If the member cannot 
repay the loan, he will not receive a new loan in the future and the cow will be given to the next 
member. Thus, the cow is used as a collateral. The land of the member is also used as a collateral. For 
instance, if a member secretly sells the cow, the institution can claim the land of the borrower, but this 
has never happened. It seems that this group lending initiative for a cow is working, but the duration of 
the project is too long and the impact is too little to copy the system to other areas. 
§ 5.1.6 Dilemma 
There is an inherent dilemma in the design of the group lending contracts used by microfinance 
institutions. The microenterprises usually have very little start-up capital. Most urban enterprises 
operate on short-term planning cycles, often daily or weekly. This is also evident from the loans 
outstanding at the microfinance institutions: short-term finance, in quite small amounts, what is most 
needed. As the businesses of the members develop they need larger loans. This is where a problem 
arises: from a financial perspective, a successful microfinance institution will in general have high 
repayment rates8. As a microfinance institution develops, its client base demands larger loans. This 
follows from the use of progressive lending and the development (expansion) of the enterprises of the 
members. But there are limitations to group lending contracts, which led Russian and Europe 
programmes to focus on individual lender-borrower contracts instead (Aghion and Morduch, 2000).  
 
The staff of LPKM told us that in the future they want to address group lending contracts for farmers. 
This can mean that they alter the design or stop loans based on groups. Until now LPKM and the 
microfinance institutions are not pleased with the group lending contracts. The precise reason for this 
is unknown. 
 
§ 5.2 Meeting members and staff 
 
A few times a year the staff of the microfinance institution organises a meeting for all its members. 
The number of organised meetings often depends on the needs of members and differs per institution. 
The purpose of this meeting is to strengthen the social cohesion, to profit from people’s natural 
disposition to avoid social stigma as an incentive to repay loans and to discuss all kinds of problems. 
This can be associated with the handing out of all kinds of awards to its members during a meeting 
between the members and the staff of Kopmaba. Awards were given to the best borrower, best group 
leader, best group member and the entrepreneur with the best management. The three main topics of 
the meetings were the financial report of the institution, the regulations and the late repayments. By 
discussing repayments by individual members, the institution transfers part of the costly monitoring 




 Despite the success of microfinance institutions  in their ability to achieve financial sustainability. The "successful" 
achievement of financial sustainability may involve large costs in terms of borrowers, socio-economic impoverishment. 
MICROFINANCE DILEMMA: THE CASE OF BANDUNG, INDONESIA 
 
Wewi/RuG 44 
effort, normally incurred by the institution, to the borrowers. However, this peer monitoring is not as 
intense as with group lending. The monitoring effect from public discussion of late repayments at 
meetings is enforced by the fact that all members know each other well and live close to each other. 
According to the data from the members questionnaire, 12 per cent knows the other members very 
well and 80 per cent knows the other members well9.  
 
The meeting with the members can be an elementary source of information from which the staff can 
get information on potentially delinquent borrowers, and the assembly can be used as an instrument to 
create pressure. Moreover, meetings can facilitate education and training in a wide range of areas. 
Another advantage of these meetings is that the transaction cost of lending small amounts can be 
reduced for LPKM as well as for the microfinance institution. The meetings are also used to collect the 
instalments and to hand in new loan proposals, so it is an efficient way to avoid transportation costs. 
Finally, because the target group of microfinance institutions have by definition little experience with 
banking, the needs and comfort of the clients can be met by encouraging them to approach the 
microfinance institution as a group. For all these different reasons the meetings between the members 
and the staff are important. 
 
Another function of the meetings is voting. Every attendant at the meeting receives a voting right. In 
77 per cent of the cases the staff of the institution decides the topics of voting. The two main topics of 
voting are regulation of the microfinance institution and plans to develop the institution. Other topics 
of voting are for instance the members of the staff, obligations for members and election of profit 
distribution (Sisa Hasil Usaha). A special meeting at the end of the year is organised to present the 
annual report, Rapat Angota Tahunan, to the members. This report contains information concerning 
the loans outstanding, total members, the distribution of  next year’s profit, and several financial 
issues. For instance, the institution can decide to use the profit to distribute to its members or invest in 
the institution. It is good to see the contribution of members by voting, but according to the staff 
respondents, 95 per cent of the microfinance institutions use the votes of the members only as a 
recommendation and no one uses it as a real obligation. This could indicate that the role of voting is 
not as great as it might be. 
 
The attendance at these meetings differs per meeting. Members often have other more important things 
to do; for example work or some kind of emergency makes it impossible for them to attend the 
meeting. However, the staff of the microfinance institution does not invite every member to the 




 While LPKM only indirectly interacts with the borrowers of the microfinance institutions, sometimes there is an exception. 
They never address the clients of the microfinance institutions  without consulting and without the approval of the  
microfinance institutions, since that would be regarded as impolite. If microfinance institutions have substantial difficulties 
with one of their members, for instance regarding the repayment, LPKM can act as an intermediair and hopefully they can 
reach an agreement. 
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meeting; 86 per cent of the respondents says that not every member is invited to the meeting. 
Attending a meeting brings along opportunity costs, because the time spent at the meeting cannot be 
used for working. While the opportunity cost of time is higher for the rich, meetings may also drive 
away the poor. The height of the costs of attending in a meeting depends on a number of factors. First, 
the distance members have to travel to come to the meeting place. For 72 per cent of the members the 
distance from the members’ house to the microfinance institution is less than 500 meters. This 
indicates a relatively low time cost of participation, but 12 per cent has to travel more than 3 
kilometres. The average distance from the members’ home to a meeting place is 7.6 kilometres on 
average, with the highest distance being 100 kilometres and the lowest of 10 meters. Especially in the 
rural area the distance from the members house to the institution is great. The length of the meeting is 
the second factor influencing the time cost of participation. The duration of the meeting between 
members and staff is in most cases (84 per cent) no longer than two hours. The average meeting time 
is 115 minutes, and the average appropriate meeting time according to the members’ respondents is 
even longer, so members are willing to bear the cost, which indicates an appreciation of the meetings. 
 
§ 5.3 Meeting staff and LPKM 
 
Every month a meeting between the staff of all affiliated microfinance institutions and LPKM is 
organised. Often, it is difficult to pick a day and an appropriate time for the meeting, because of the 
large number of people invited. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss problems the institutions face 
and to discuss the financial reports. At the beginning of the meeting the staff members of the 
institutions can list topics or problems they wish to discuss during the meeting. The topics discussed at 
the meeting in June 2001 were: 
• how can an institution make new members;  
• how to deal with administrational problems;  
• low attendancy at meeting between members and staff of institution;  
• how to get funds;  
• which criteria should an institution use to distribute the money;  
• unawareness of the other services provided, such as training;  
• how to make a new proposal to receive a loan from LKPM;  
• how to cover costs, the interest rate being much lower at formal banks;  
• how does LPKM deal with late repayments of the institutions; 
• what if LPKM lacks funds to distribute among the institution. 
 
Later on at the meeting the staff of LPKM tried to answer these questions. For instance if an institution 
has problems with the administration, the staff from other institutions try to make a positive 
contribution to the solution of the problem. Perhaps they faced the same problems and they can explain 
how they solved it. Support and assistance is not only offered by LPKM, the microfinance institutions 
also try to help each other and share experiences. Thus, the discussions are always very interactive.  
 
Besides these topics provided by the staff of the affiliated institutions, there are some topics that are 
fixed and therefore discussed at every meeting. At the meetings the microfinance institutions are 
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informed about the financial performance of their colleagues. This is explicitly done at the beginning 
of the assembly. The staff is forced to run their microfinance institution properly, to avoid that they 
will be embarrassed in front of their peers10. This stimulus is at this moment quite forceful, since the 
financial resources available are scarce.  
 
In the future LPKM wants to rely more on peer pressure; staff of the microfinance institutions will 
visit each other to exchange advice and recommendations11. There is a clearly pattern of enhancing the 
co-operation is visible.  
 
Every year the best institution receives a reward for its performance. At the meeting in June 2001 
LPKM handed out an award to the best institution, Mitra Sejahtera. This was mainly based on their 
administration, financial report, and repayment. They receive a trophy and a certificate. The attendance 
of the meetings varies; at the meeting in April only 62 per cent (13 of the 21) of the affiliated 
institutions attended and at the next meeting 75 per cent institutions attended. As mentioned before, 
attending a meeting brings along opportunity costs. It shows that the average distance from the staff 
members’ home to the meeting place with LPKM is 37 kilometres, with a maximum distance of 90 
kilometres and minimum of 10 metres. Also, almost every staff member has to make use of public 
transportation, which takes more time to travel. The cost of travelling is to some extent paid for by 
LPKM. The length of the meeting between the staff of the institutions and LPKM is on average 239 
minutes.  
 
§ 5.4 Dynamic incentives 
 
Dynamic incentives are often used by microfinance institutions as a tool to enforce repayment. The 
institutions affiliated with LPKM use the threat of losing new or additional loans as a mechanism to 
enforce repayment. Table 5.3 shows that in most cases when a borrower could not repay the instalment 
on time, the institution banned the delinquent borrower. The formal policy is that borrowers are shut 
off from future credit when they are three times late with their payment. 
 
The above description is the formal transcript, it is difficult to judge how flexible or strict the 
microfinance institutions follow this policy12. To ensure timely repayment LPKM visits the 
microfinance institutions and inflicts pressure on the microfinance institutions. The impression we got 
was that LPKM has a flexible attitude towards the microfinance institutions. This policy is 
recommendable, since it allows LPKM to adapt to new situations and conditions in order to build a 




 In Indonesia people want to avoid situations and circumstances that make them feel malu (embarrassed). 
11
 A consequence of this intensified cooperation, was the merger between Batalungceng and BMW Bandung. 
12
 After the financial crisis the terms and conditions were less strict. 
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long-term sustainable relationship with the (new) microfinance institutions. For instance, if a micro 
credit enterprise faces difficulties, it can obtain more time if there is a valid reason. 
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Table 5.3  Dynamic incentives 







(2) What did the microfinance institute do when you could not repay the 
instalment on time? 
(%) 
Banned me from further loans  
Made a new loan agreement 
Gave me a remainder 
Gave me a fine 
Made me pay double the next month 



























Respondents: 63 members 
 
When the staff receives signals that a borrower faces difficulties, they visit the member and try to find 
a solution. However, the microfinance institutions have specific rules concerning late repayments. The 
basic rule can best be explained with an example. This month a borrower is due Rp. 100,000. Even if 
the borrower is one day late with the payment, the fine is two per cent of the Rp. 100.000. After one 
month the penalty rate is increased by 2 per cent to 4 per cent, this means the fine is 4 per cent of the 
first Rp. 100,000 and of the amount due the next month. When the delinquent borrowers pay their 
fines, they are eligible for another loan but they certainly do not have priority. Another sanction issued 
by the other members is that at the end of they year they vote on which problematic borrowers are 
candidates for terminating of their membership. Of course, these borrowers can defend themselves. 
Generally, this is the policy, but the precise level of the penalty rate differs according to the agreement 
between the microfinance institutions and  their members. 
 
The members think that they will receive a new loan if they repay the old one on time and without 
problems. Only 5 per cent of the respondents thinks that he will probably not receive another loan in 
the future (see table 5.3). The staff of the institutions responded that the members would definitely 
receive another loan if they pay all the instalments on time. It shows that 90 per cent of the 
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respondents did indeed receive a new loan after repaying the first one. When a member repaid all the 
instalments on time but did not receive a new loan, this was due to the lack of funding at the 
microfinance institution, or the members ask for an amount that was too large for his individual 
credibility. 
 
This threat, dynamic incentives, can only be meaningful if members think or expect the microfinance 
institution is willing and able to strictly deny loans to clients who do not repay. While the loan size 
depends on the amount of savings among other things, microborrowers can obtain a larger loan when 
they repay their old loan (progressive lending). Microfinance institutions should be careful about 
granting loans to already problematic borrowers, since this can harm the discipline of even good 
borrowers. The microfinance institutions as well as LPKM must follow a policy that states that 
delinquent borrowers will not be eligible for a new loan and both must be willing to communicate this 
to the clients. 
 
The threat to exclude a defaulter from future credit is less effective if individuals can simply move to 
another moneylender. Competition among the microfinance institutions belonging to LPKM and 
competition between other programmes can diminish dynamic incentives and undermines the 
repayment rates of both programmes. Co-operation with the other microfinance programmes can 
therefore be mutually beneficial, since the objective is to reduce poverty and not to make a profit. To 
prevent the switching of members LPKM has ordered that a member can only be affiliated to one 
microfinance institution. The strength of this incentive is also influenced by how much borrowers care 
about future credit availability and whether they prefer moneylender to others. Thus, this threat 
depends heavily on the alternative sources of credit being very expensive or non-existent. 
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Chapter 6 Outreach of the programme 
 
A target market is a group of potential clients who share certain characteristics, tend to behave in 
similar ways and are likely to be attracted to specific combinations of products and services (Morduch, 
1999). A microfinance institution can identify its target market by looking at the characteristics of the 
potential clients. In this chapter we look at four characteristics of the members that influence the 
impact, design and performance of the programme: poverty level, gender, geographic focus, and 
ethnicity and religion.  
 
§ 6.1 Poverty level 
 
The extent to which microfinance focuses on the poor depends among other things on whether the 
height of the interest rate will deter the poor. The interest rate annually charged by the institutions is 
approximately 24 per cent. Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) provide loans that tend to be larger (and thus 
less focused on the poor) at a commercially viable rate of 34 per cent per year (Park and Chen, 2001). 
The rates of commercial banks are even higher. The microfinance institutions compete with the black 
market (40 per cent per year) by combining lending services with other non-financial services and by 
charging a lower interest rate. In this context it is important to keep in mind that Bank Indonesia now 
expects inflation to be between 9 and 11 per cent in 2001 (World Bank, 2000). But while subsidising 
interest rates can improve targeting in theory, in practice charging interest rates that are too low makes 
the loans attractive to the rich. One way to circumvent this is to exclude richer households on the basis 
of eligibility requirements. These very low interest rates compared to official interest rates have made 
the loans also attractive for enterprises and revenue-generating projects. The distributors and leader of 
the microfinance institutions are sensitive to nepotism, making it difficult to implement eligibility rules 
effectively.  
 
When members of the institutions affiliated with LPKM were asked what the highest interest rate per 
month was they are willing to pay, the average response was 2.44 per cent. The average rate they felt 
they could pay was 2.26 per cent per month (see table 6.1). The average loan amount is Rp. 834,375, 
but 93 per cent of the respondents said they would not be willing to pay more interest for a larger loan.  
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Table 6.1  Reaching the poor 



















Average 2.44%    













Average 2.26%    
(3) What amount did you receive as a loan? (%) 
< 250,000 
250,000 – 500,000 
500,001 – 1,000,000 
1,000,001 – 1,500,000 
1,500,001 – 2,000,000 









Average Rp. 834,375   







(5) Do you have any outstanding loans at an institution than at 















OUTREACH OF THE PROGRAMME 
 
Wewi/RuG  53 
Insurance office 3 
Work 3 
(7) If there were no microfinance programme, would you still  













(9) If yes, where would you get the funds?  (%) 
Savings 
Borrow from informal sources 
Borrow from formal bank 









Respondents: 63 members 
 
If we look at how many of the respondents have a loan somewhere else than at the microfinance 
institution, we see that this is the case for 49 per cent. This could mean that these members borrow 
somewhere else to repay their loan to the microfinance institution or vice versa. From this 49 per cent, 
58 per cent has a loan outstanding at family, which is often not seen as a ‘real’ loan. Furthermore, 21 
per cent has a loan at a formal bank, this is remarkable because normally (the poorest of) poor are 
excluded from formal bank, because of the collateral requirement and the higher interest rate (see table 
6.1).  
 
Table 6.1 shows that many members would still undertake the project (84 per cent) at the same scale 
(75 per cent), even without the microfinance institution. Their funding would come from savings (48 
per cent), which again could indicate that the clients these microfinance institutions serve are not the 
poorest of poor. Also, 30 per cent would borrow from informal sources, which are large competition to 
the institutions. These findings are rather peculiar, since the obvious question is, if they have savings 
to finance their project on the same scale, why do these members borrow from their institutions? One 
answer may be that they value the training and services provided by the microfinance institutions. This 
explanation is not completely tenable, because members can attend the education meetings even if they 
are not eligible for a microloan. However, these people do not have the priority of the microfinance 
institutions. Another suggestion is whether the clients have such a clear picture of their financial 
position in case they do not receive a loan from the microfinance institutions. In addition, it is well-
known that people put money from different sources differently in mental accounts. This may explain 
partly why members do not use their savings as a financial source to finance their projects. These 
strange findings make further detailed examination worthwhile.  
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One of the informal sources members get money from is the black market. This black market can be a 
serious threat to the social mission of the microfinance institutions, since the loans from the 
microfinance institutions must bring net benefits to the poor. It is also possible that efforts to offer new 
credit (i.e. from the microfinance institutions) will simply substitute other credit sources and can 
therefore have small marginal effects. If loans from black moneylenders are substituted for loans from 
microfinance institutions, this will definitely have a positive effect on the welfare and well-being of 
the members (see section 3.4). However, it may not result in a better position for the low-income 
households members make use of the black market to pay off loans from the microfinance institutions. 
So high repayment rates are not the same as high impact. Evidence for this has been made available by 
other researchers. Rahman (1999) comes to the conclusion in his anthropological research that 
borrowers maintain their regular repayment schedules through loan recycling, the money comes from 
sources other than their own, which increases debt liability of individual households and leads to 
increased tension and frustration. On the other hand, loans from microfinance institutions must not 
simply crowd out credit from other sources (impact). This has crucial implications for moral hazard 
and the working of dynamic incentives (see chapter 2). It is possible that a negative impact takes place, 
because one programme siphons off the best borrowers, leaving the other moneylender with a more 
risky pool of clients and higher enforcement costs than before. 
 
So good repayment rates can indicate that borrowers receive loans from another lender, which may 
provide better services, lower interest rates, or more appropriate terms. If this is the case, the 
microfinance institution should study how it can be of help to the members who live in poverty. 
 
§ 6.2 Gender 
 
Attention to gender is important, next to the effect on the repayment of loans. The provision of 
financial services directly to women aids in the process to empower women by increasing their 
economic position in society. Female entrepreneurs have attracted special interest from microfinance 
institutions, because they almost always make up the poorest segment of society, they are generally 
responsible for child rearing (including education, health and nutrition), and they often have fewer 
economic opportunities than men. Women face cultural barriers that often restrict them to the home 
(for example, Islamic purdah), making it difficult for them to access financial services. Also, they have 
more traditional roles than men in the economy and may be less able to run a business outside their 
homes.  
 
The microfinance institutions rationale for targeting women over men, for example in Bangladesh, is 
based on the assumption of women’s greater contribution to family welfare. The general hypothesis is 
that women’s priority is to invest their earnings in their children, followed by other households’ 
necessities. Therefore, lending to women and increasing their earnings brings more qualitative benefits 
to family welfare than the earnings of men (see also Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
 
But there are also other reasons why some microfinance programmes aim their efforts on lending to 
women. Experience has shown that women generally have a great sense of responsibility and are more 
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affected by social pressure. Women are accepted in these programmes because of their vulnerable 
position. Vulnerability is understood by looking at the limited physical mobility of women and their 
culturally patterned behaviour (shy, passive and submissive). Women attend more group meetings, are 
more reliable, and are more disciplined. Men do not come to meetings, are arrogant, argue with 
microfinance institutions’ employees, and sometimes they even threaten and scare them. This evidence 
comes from Rahman (1999) and he also shows that in the households of women borrowers the persons 
who control and use the loan and arrange instalments are in 60 per cent of the cases the men.  
 
The decision to focus on women by some programmes has obvious reasons. The lower mobility of 
women may be a benefit where moral hazard is a problem. Also, where women have fewer alternatives 
borrowing possibilities than men, dynamic incentives will be increased. From the total members of the 
affiliated microfinance institutions in November 2000, 46 per cent were female (Suroso, 2001), but the 
information received from the members shows that this percentage increased to 57 per cent in June 
2001. From interviews with the staff of the institutions and of LPKM we concluded that there is low 
mobility among members, especially among women. The lower mobility of members, and especially 
women, is caused by their marital status and their children. From the member respondents 77 per cent 
is married and only 10 per cent has no children. Both of these percentages indicate a low chance of 
moral hazard.  
 
§ 6.3 Geographic focus 
 
For a microfinance institution it is very important whether it will serve urban or rural clients. This 
decision greatly affects the development of products and services, and it should be based on both the 
activities characteristic of different geographical settings and the varying levels of infrastructure 
development in urban and rural areas. The institutions affiliated to LPKM serve the urban and the rural 
area. Five of the institutions affiliated to LPKM are located in a rural area and provide financial 
services to rural members, based on a general lack of supply of services outside urban centres and on 
the fact that in some countries poverty is largely a rural phenomenon (see table 4.1). Providing 
services to rural clients can therefore be an effective instrument to reach a large number of poor 
households. Most institutions were initiated by people living close to each other and their members 
also live in the same area. Therefore, for most institutions it was quite obvious where to locate the 
institution and whether to serve urban or rural clients. Also because of time and mobility constraints, 
microfinance institutions need services that are located close to their business and that can process 
transactions quickly.  
 
§ 6.4 Ethnicity and religion 
 
Indonesia has over 300 ethnic groups, while Java is relatively homogeneous with three main groups. 
Nevertheless, Java has various ethnic subregions with distinct variations in language and culture. The 
three main ethnic groups, each speaking their own language, are the Javanese of Central and East Java, 
the Madurese from the island of Madura off the northeast coast, and the Sundanese of West Java. The 
Sundanese form the second largest ethnic group in Java and in Indonesia. Indonesia is mainly Muslim, 
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but Christian, Hindus and Buddhists communities also live in Java. Today the Islam is the official 
religion of 90 per cent of Javanese, and Islamic traditions and rituals affect all aspects of the daily life. 
In Indonesia and other Islamic countries there are specific banking laws for institutions that provide 
financial services. According to Khayat (1996), the main difference between Islamic and conventional 
banking products is that in Islamic banking, money cannot be treated as a commodity but must be used 
productively (like labour and land). Islamic banks also cannot charge or pay interest. The Muamalat 
Bank in Bandung is a bank that charges and pays no interest, but its clientele is from the strict Muslim 
community.    
 
Even though UNPAR is a Catholic university; it is open to students and employees from other 
religions and ethnic backgrounds. However, providing community development services sometimes 
leads to resistance from the mainly Islamic community. The Islamic community is restrained to the 
Catholic programmes, because they are afraid that the programmes are not for community 
development but will change their religion. Among the staff of LPKM there are also Muslims, which 
makes the community less reluctant to the programmes.  
 
§ 6.5 Types of activities 
 
In addition to determining the characteristics of the clients served by the microfinance institution, it is 
important to consider the types of activities in which the target market is active. The economic sector 
of activities is also important, because each sector has its own specific risks and financing needs, 
which directly influence the choices made by the institution and the services and products provided. 
The main economic activity of the members is the running of small-scale businesses (51 per cent), as 
can be seen in table 6.2. The main activities of these businesses are food selling and selling other 
articles of use, ranging from cigarettes to candy. With 22 per cent housewives make up a large part of 
the members. Other occupations of members are: employees at large factories, teachers, farmers and, 
drivers of public transportation means. The intended purpose of the loan is for small-scale business (51 
per cent), 34 per cent of the members uses the money to run their existing business, and 32 per cent 
needs the loan to grow and expand their existing business.  
 
Table 6.2  Occupation of the members  
(1) Occupation  (%) 
Small scale business 51 
Housewife  22 
Employee  5 
Teacher  5 
Farmer  3 
Driver of public transportation means   3 
University student 3 
Unknown  3 
Other  5 
Respondents: 63 members  
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Chapter 7 Financial perspective 
 
§ 7.1 Funding of LPKM 
 
While the microfinance institutions (and LPKM) can be rewarded for their social achievements in 
improving the lives of the poor, there is also another side to this story: the ongoing struggle of the 
microfinance institutions to relieve the credit constraints of the poor and at the same time contain the 
costs.  
 
Since these microfinance institutions are not financially independent, they are substantially subsidised 
by LPKM and some of them are also financed by other sources. For the microfinance institutions the 
amount and the source of all the loans outstanding are presented in table 7.1. The column total loans 
lists the cumulative amount outstanding at the various moneylenders. Dapen is an account that belongs 
to two employees at LPKM, this is considered in more detail in Appendix C Funding. It is also shown 
that not all microfinance institutions receive financial resources from LPKM; nevertheless, they 
receive education and training provided by the staff of LPKM. As will be explained in the next section, 
mobilising savings can be an important source of financing the loans (see table 7.1). The column total 
Savings represents the savings of the borrowers at the various institutions, this is calculated by adding 
up the three separated savings accounts, grand savings, basic savings and voluntary savings 
respectively.  
 
Large enterprises have to transfer 5 per cent of their profit to small-scale businesses in the form of a 
loan. A common complication was and still is that the fulfilment of these loan agreements is difficult 
to accomplish. Apparently, people see these as a gift they do not have to pay back, and there is the 
conviction that the loans come directly from the government, which has enough money in the eyes of 
the people. The interest rate on these kinds of loans differs between companies; the rate is usually 
between 11 and 18 per cent. 
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Table 7.1  Loan amounts outstanding and total savings (amounts in Rupiah) 
Institution LPKM  Dapena Koernib P.C. Surosoc Total Loans Total Savings 
BMW Bandung 41,063,209 1,665,500 1,500,000 4,999,500 49,228,209 29,000,000 
Kopmaba 61,254,632 1,500,000 - - 62,754,632 44,543,700 
Anugerah - - - - 0 7,216,000 
Mitra Sejahtera  6,116,000 - - - 6,116,000 N A 
Mitra Umat - - - - 0 N A 
Mitra Mandiri 1,201,600 - - - 1,201,600 19,826,850 
Mitra Wargi Saluyu - - - - 0 302,000 
Surya Mandiri - - - - 0 300,000 
Dulang Perak - - - - 0 N A 
Multi Usaha  14,581,500 539,000 - 4,000,000 19,120,500 N A 
Setia Kawan - - - - 0 N A 
Tatali Wargi 13,899,800 - - - 13,899,800 73,542,329 
Mega Prima - - - - 0 1,970,500 
Paguyuban Warga 3,514,400 - - - 3,514,400 N A 
Koprima  - - - - 0 2,688,000 
Cibangkong Sebelas 2,915,000 - - - 2,915,000 14,230,200 
BMW Sumadang 18,071,500 - - - 18,071,500 5,256,600 
Batulonceng - - - - 0 N A 
Nurul Amal  1,667,400 - - - 1,667,400 N A 
Kowardes Berkah 8,823,150 - - - 8,823,150 N A 
Baruna Siribon 5,000,000 - - - 5,000,000 N A 
a)  Finance for educations of the staff  
b)  Lecturer at UNPAR 
c)  Head of LPKM 
Source: LPKM 
 
Kopmaba and BMW Bandung also received loans with an interest rate of 16 per cent from Pupuk 
Kujang, a government department specialised in fertilisers. The money was transferred to LPKM, but 
the institutions themselves are liable for the loan. To qualify for a loan from Pupuk Kujang, the 
microfinance institutions need a recommendation from LPKM. Another moneylender is Merci Corp 
International, which distributes funds across microfinance institutions and small-scale enterprises. 
LPKM gets its funding from many sources: university foundation, lecturers at the university, local 
government, and NGO’s from Canada. Appendix C shows detailed information on the various 
financial sources. 
 
§ 7.2 Savings 
 
The microfinance institutions offer not only loans to the members, they also provide savings services. 
However, there are microfinance institutions that have members who do not save and therefore are not 
eligible for a loan at this moment. They merely join the microfinance institution for the training 
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provided. This is possible and allowed, but during the training these members do not have priority. The 
institutions divide the savings into three accounts: grand savings (Simpanan Pokok), basic savings 
(Simpanan Wajib) and voluntary savings (Simpanan Sukarela). Some of the microfinance institutions 
bring their money to an official commercial bank. But this is rare, because microfinance institutions 
are usually short of money. If they do  have financial resources, these are quickly exhausted since the 
money is redistributed to the members in the form of loans. 
 
Each client when becoming a member is obligated to save a minimum amount of Rp. 5,000. This is 
called the basic or compulsory savings and the amount is the same at every institution. These savings 
represent funds that must be contributed by the members, and they are one of the conditions for 
receiving a loan. This account can best be considered as part of a loan rather than a savings product, 
since a member cannot appeal to this fund in difficult times and these funds are closely linked to 
receiving a loan. Of course, the borrowers consider this fund as an asset. Besides his contribution to 
the grand/compulsory account, each member also has to save an amount every month. This account is 
called basic savings. All institutions ask the same amount from their clients to add to these savings. 
When the loan is repaid, the member can withdraw the grand and basic savings, that is if he withdraws 
his membership from the microfinance institution. Voluntary savings are not an obligatory part of 
accessing credit services; voluntary savings services are provided to members, so that they can deposit 
or withdraw according to their needs. 
 
The grand and basic savings are useful for the members, but also for the microfinance institution. They 
serve as an additional guarantee mechanism to ensure loan repayment, help to build up the asset base 
of the clients, provide funds for emergencies, and provide information to the staff of the institutions on 
the ability of the members to deal with cash flow and periodic payments (screening). The microfinance 
institutions are obligated by national government rule to separate the savings into these accounts.  
 
Finally, when looking at the balance sheet of the microfinance institutions there is a fourth striking 
account, called special savings. These are contributions by non-members or by the staff of LPKM. The 
interest these socially minded receive on this account is, obviously low in comparison with other 
alternatives. Rismansyah and Rachmanto, employees at LPKM, monthly give Rp. 5,000 of fixed 
savings to Bina Mitra Warga Bandung and to Kopmaba.  
 
Legal restrictions limit the payment of interest, of a positive nominal return. If the microfinance 
institutions want to offer a positive nominal return, the legal form has to change; they are then 
regarded as a bank. One of the striking differences compared to other microfinance institutions is that 
the clients do not receive interest on their savings, instead the members of an institution can obtain part 
of the profit, i.e. dividend. In this context it is worthwhile to notice that the regulation of micro credit 
nowadays is under the department of co-operation and small and medium enterprises. LPKM, together 
with 37 other organisations in Bandung, take the initiative to try to achieve that the regulations 
concerning micro credit will resign under the auspices of the Central Bank. This makes it possible to 
develop the micro credit programmes further. 
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Thus the natural question arises, why do members save at the institution? The general rule is that a 
client can borrow up to three times his accumulated savings; so the more savings, the more a client can 
borrow. This rule induces members to save at the institution in order to become eligible for a loan. 
Members do not earn interest, as mentioned before, but they can obtain dividend. The division of 
dividend, if there is any profit in the past year, depends among other things on the amount of savings 
of a member. This can be regarded as a substitute for interest. 
 
In table 7.2 the profit distribution as used by the institution Kopmaba is reproduced. The same profit 
distribution is used at the other microfinance institutions, but with minor differences. Kopmaba 
distributes 45 per cent of the profit among its members: dividend to the best savers, and a percentage 
to the best borrowers (Balal Jasa Pinjaman). Every member receives shares depending on the amount 
they save or borrow. When a member saves for instances Rp. 1,000,  he receives one share, and the 
profit is distributed to the members according to the number of shares they own. This mechanism is a 
good incentive to members to save at the institution, but unfortunately most institutions do not make a 
profit. The same method is used for borrowers but there is an extra condition: that the borrower must 
repay the instalment every time, and if the borrower misses just one repayment he receives no profit. 
The other ledgers are shown in table 7.2.  
 
Table 7.2  Profit distribution microfinance institution Kopmaba    
Percentage Distribution 
22.5% Dividend (distributed among best savers)  
22.5% Balas Jasa Pinjaman (BJP; distributed among best borrowers)13 
25%  Retained earnings 
10% Reserved for management (used for advice by management) 
5% Social welfare 
5% Staff welfare (like a bonus) 
5% Education 
5% Development working area 
Source: LPKM 
 
The basic and grand savings act as a form of collateral, since generally they are not available for 
withdrawal when a loan is outstanding. By being required to set aside funds as savings, borrowers 
cannot utilise those funds for their business activities or other investments. Because the members of 
the institutions do not earn interest, this results in an opportunity cost that is equal to the difference 
between what they earn now (i.e. zero per cent) and the return they could have earned. 
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§ 7.2.1 Future 
One of the goals of LPKM is to transform the microfinance institutions into small (formal) banks, 
including the ability to mobilise savings. This makes sense for several reasons. First, savings provide a 
relatively inexpensive source of capital for relending. Second, the depositors of today can be 
tomorrow’s borrowers, so this creates a client pool. Third, building savings can increase the welfare of 
the members, which is the objective of the microfinance industry, by building assets that can act as 
collateral. They can use this asset for example to reduce the volatility in consumption. 
 
Just as there are principles for lending to the poor, there are principles for providing savings services 
that the several microfinance institutions need to be aware of. To attract deposits from members the 
following principles need to be adhered to. The desired savings instruments must offer safety, 
convenience, ready access to money, and a positive return.  
 
Regarding safety we would like to make the following remarks. Regarding the collecting of savings, it 
is the customer who must trust the microfinance institution. Deposit clients must be convinced that the 
microfinance institution staff is competent and honest. The information we acquired from the staff of 
LPKM and through surveys and conversations with the members points out that members are 
convinced that their savings are safe. The saver knows the staff of the microfinance institutions: they 
meet at trainings, meetings and when they apply for a loan. Another reason they trust the microfinance 
institutions is that most institutions work near the office of the institute. People in the community are 
familiar with each other usually well before a microfinance institution has started. All microfinance 
institutions provide bankbooks, which specifies the amount of savings and the date it was deposited. 
To cover the cost, the microfinance institutions charge an entrance fee. Caution is essential, since the 
Indonesian people have a tendency to associate additional charges with corruption. Ultimately, 
however, word of mouth is the best form to ensure trust. One man living in an area of Cibaduyut, a 
tight community with an informal leader, said that he was very hopeful about the founding of a new 
microfinance institution. If the institution does something good, other people in the area will know it 
very quickly. If the institution does something bad, they will talk about that for years to come.  
 
A bank must be financially sustainable if it wants to provide services on a widespread and continued 
basis. To accomplish this transformation, certain key features of the microfinance institutions that are 
members of LPKM need to be changed. Until now, none of the microfinance institutions are 
financially sustainable. Financial self-sufficiency is essential for making financial services widely 
available to micro-enterprises, they can expand to meet the demand of their customers and thus help 
the poor. To this end, the microfinance institutions can rely more on the savings of their members as a 
relatively cheap source of capital. This does necessarily mean that they have to pay interest on their 
savings, because several studies show that savers value liquidity over returns and a well-suited design 
of the savings instruments (Charitonenko, Patten and Yaron, 1998). However, research may be suitable 
to look at whether the increase in savings (reduction in capital costs) outweighs the extra interest costs. 
As mentioned above, savers value ready access to their money, i.e. liquidity. This is where a problem 
arises for the microfinance institutions, because they have at this moment low liquidity. This can even 
undermine the stability of a healthy financial institution.  






Wewi/RuG  63 
§ 7.3 Subsidies  
 
LPKM needs to keep an eye on the efficiency of the microfinance institutions, but it must also mind its 
own efficiency. The staff at LPKM receives a fixed salary from the university, and the funds from 
donors are fully redistributed to the microfinance institutions, so no money is ever retained for the 
purposes of LPKM or the Parahyangan Catholic University. Especially in the light of the expansion of 
member institutions (during our research period eight new institutions became affiliated with LPKM), 
it is important to work efficiently since the time and the money available for giving training, approving 
of loan proposals and checking financial reports is limited. Money from donors can be very unstable 
and can threaten the existence of a microfinance institution. Therefore, microfinance institutions want 
to be financially independent, but interviews with the staff of LPKM suggest that this is not a concern. 
LPKM expects sources to be available in the near future. For detailed information on the subsidies, see 
Appendix C.   
 
LPKM has to make sure that the donation of the money or the granting of concessional loans does not 
dilute its social mission and change their philosophy. Until now donors only want to see a monthly 
financial report. The involvement of donors and the local government in providing microfinance has 
its pros and cons. Semi-government microfinance programmes are sometimes perceived as social 
welfare instead of economic development efforts, which results in problematic and depressing 
repayment rates. They can be a source of learning, since many donors have worked with specific 
institutions in specific regions and with certain approaches. Sharing these experiences can benefit 
donors as well as LPKM. Personally, we think this is not a (potential) problem for LPKM, but 
nevertheless we would like to warn LPKM to be cautious about this issue. 
 
§ 7.4 Repayment 
 
Nowadays, microfinance institutions are forced to operate on a full-cost recovery basis. A common 
explanation being is that micro-credit programmes that can cover their own cost can expand and serve 
more clients. The purpose of the microfinance institutions is to provide the poor with long-term 
continued access to financial services. This can only be achieved if all costs are covered. If an 
institution is inefficient in delivering credit and consequently needs to raise its interest rate, clients 
may not find value in the credit offered and the institutions will have difficulties to stay in business. 
 
The next subsections outline the financial data to study the performance in another context and to 
increase the understanding of the programme. The financial performance indicates whether the 
programme is well designed: are the mechanisms used effectively? 
§ 7.4.1 Repayment microfinance institutions 
Although a detailed analysis of the financial performance and health of the microfinance programmes 
belonging to LPKM was neither carried out nor our focus, a first glance reveals that they are not 
financially sustainable. This conclusion is reached after looking at the financial reports and from 
interviews with the staff of LPKM.  
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Ideally, we would like to analyse the repayment performance of the individual microfinance 
institutions, but due to a combination of language difficulties, missing or incorrect financial reports, 
and time pressure, this was impossible. Therefore, we have chosen to infer the success of the 
microfinance institutions by looking at the repayment of loans granted by LPKM. This certainly has 
drawbacks14, but it will provide an insight into how the mechanisms used and the design of the 
programme provides incentives to the microfinance institutions and the clients to pay back the loans. 
 
LPKM forces the microfinance institutions to attain and retain better performance and at the same time 
provide incentives to adopt the lending techniques that have proven to be valuable. 
While social capital is important in group lending contracts, LPKM utilises this capital to improve the 
repayment rates of the individual liability microfinance institutions. The financial and social meetings 
elicit several types of group dynamics, which may increase repayment rates. Another reason why this 
technique can be helpful, is that the financial resources are scarce, so when another micro credit 
institution is running its business unsuccessfully, this means that there is less money to redistribute by 
LPKM.  
 
Generally, high repayment rates help LPKM and the microfinance institutions to meet the demand of 
their target group. However, high repayment rates do not mean that there is more money to redistribute 
if the costs are not contained.  Moreover, it does not automatically mean that the programme will have 
a social impact.  
 
The microfinance institutions are forced by LPKM to be financially self-sufficient, so that more 
members and institutions can be served. The loan recovery rates are significantly influenced by the 
interest rate charged to the members, the repayment of the borrowers and the operational efficiency of 
the microfinance institutions, which will not be explicitly addressed though this does not suggests it is 
insignificant. Table 7.3 shows the repayment performance of the microfinance institutions. Appendix 
D, shows how this is calculated. The outcomes of these calculations indicate how effectively the 
programmes established the basic microfinance (proven) principles, even though these repayment 
performance are blurred by various biases (Murdoch, 1999).   
 




 Some microfinance institutions receive loans from moneylenders other than LPKM, so it is possible they use these loans to 
pay off the loans at LPKM. To measure the success in terms of lack of delinquency can be totally inappropriate to judge the 
successful achievement of the social mission of the microfinance institutions. To illustrate this we use an exaggerated 
example: an institution can use savings and perhaps other financial sources to show a respectable performance record, but 
until now has not made any loans to their members. One must bear in mind that the financial performance may be blurred by 
other events and influenced by many issues (e.g. circumstances beyond one’s control, like financial crisis and natural 
disaster). While the mechanisms used are efficient and effective in this specific surroundings. 
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Table 7.3 Repayment performance from May 2000 until April 2001    
Microfinance institution May/June/July Aug/Sept/Oct Nov/Dec/Jan Feb/March/April 
BMW Bandung 100% 100% 95% 62% 
Kopmaba 67% 24% 25% 30% 
Anugerah N A N A N A N A 
Mitra Sejahtera  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Mitra Umat N A N A N A N A 
Mitra Mandiri 0% 100% 100% 100% 
Mitra Wargi Saluyu N A N A N A N A 
Surya Mandiri N A N A N A N A 
Dulang Perak N A N A N A N A 
Multi Usaha  79% 42% 17% 0% 
Setia Kawan N A N A N A N A 
Tatali Wargi 100% 84% 69% 100% 
Mega Prima 100% 67% 100% 100% 
Paguyuban Warga N A N A N A N A 
Koprima  N A N A N A N A 
Cibangkong Sebelas 100% 100% 100% 100% 
BMW Sumadang 100% 61% 15% 0% 
Batulonceng N A N A N A N A 
Nurul Amal  50% 25% 0% 0% 
Kowardes Berkah 100% 100% 100% 59% 
Baruna Siribon N A N A N A N A 
Source: LPKM 
 
Preferably, we would like to compare the repayment rate over a longer period of time- to see whether 
financial performance is improving or deteriorating. A longer period of time also contributes to the 
reliability. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the absence of relevant data, which forced us to 
adjust our initial intention. The rates are calculated over a short period of time, one year, but 
nevertheless they give an insight into the above mentioned relation, the relative financial performance 
of the institutions, and an early assessment of the newly founded institutions.  
§ 7.4.2 Repayment members of microfinance institutions 
As mentioned before, it was not possibly to make a financial analysis of the repayment performance of 
the individual microfinance institutions. However, the member respondents gave us a clear insight into 
the repayment performance, which will be presented here. First, we look at the late repayments of the 
borrowers. As table 7.4 shows, 72 per cent of the respondents made a late repayment in the past. This 
indicates a poor repayment and can lead to financial difficulties at the institutions. With individual 
loans there is only individual liability, so the single borrower carries the burden. For microfinance 
institutions this makes it harder to enforce the loan. The main reason members could not repay the 
instalment on time, was because of business failure (37 per cent), especially due to little sales. The 
second reason was illness of the borrower, which meant he did not have an income. Other reasons for 
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late repayments were natural disasters, emergencies or borrowers that had to pay other debts first.  
 
Table 7.4  Late repayment (Respondents: 63 members) 





(2) What were the reasons for the late repayment?  (%) 
Business failure 
Illness of borrower 
Not clear 









(3) How difficult was it for you to make repayments in the past month?  (%) 
Very difficult 





(4) What sources did you use for your loan repayment in the past month?  (%) 
Income from self-employment 
Income from a wage 
Sell agriculture and livestock products 
Sell durable goods of production material 








(5) If you have difficulties to repay, what did you try to make the repayment?  (%) 
Borrow from family or friends 
Savings 
Borrow from individual member 
Went to institution and asked about rescheduling 
Borrowed from the group 
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However, the high percentage of members with a late repayment in the past does not tell us much 
about the current situation. When we look at the repayments of the last month, 18 per cent of the 
respondents found it very difficult to pay the instalment. For a larger percentage it was not difficult to 
make last month's repayment. The three main sources used for the repayment in the last month are 
income from self-employment, income from wage and selling agricultural and livestock products.  
 
When a member has no money to repay the instalment and has an individual loan, 42 per cent of the 
respondents borrows money from family or friends and 31 per cent uses their savings to repay. A 
problem that often arises when members cannot repay their loan is that they ask for another loan 
somewhere else to pay off the old one (loan recycling). But according to the respondents, they do not 
borrow from commercial banks or informal moneylenders to pay off their loan. If a member has no 
other source he can use to repay, he often goes to the microfinance institution and asks about 
rescheduling the loan term. Not only does the delinquent borrower try to use other funds to repay, by 
reducing expenditures he tries to save money to repay the loan. When there are difficulties with 
repayment the main expenditures reduced are the daily ones (48 per cent) and clothing (42 per cent). 
Besides saving money by reducing expenditures, 80 per cent answered that family members worked 
more in order to repay the loan. 
   
Usually the members take the instalment to the institution. At some institutions one member of staff is 
responsible for collecting the instalments. This is done daily, weekly or monthly, depending on the 
individual loan agreement. This shows a willingness to adapt to local circumstances. The largest 
groups, who repay the instalments daily, are the small-scale enterprises and the becak drivers. Factory 
labourers and borrowers with a weekly income usually make weekly repayments. Civil servants and 
pensioners repay monthly. However, when a member does not bring the instalment to the institution on 
time in most cases the staff visits (see table 7.4) the member to discuss the problem and ask for the 
reason. They discuss how to develop the small-scale business of the member, and sometimes the staff 
makes a new loan agreement or reschedules the loan. According to the staff, it happens often that the 
borrower says he cannot repay the instalment but it happens regularly that they are simply not willing 
to repay. Therefore, the staff not only visits the member but also asks neighbours, other members or 
relatives whether the delinquent borrower really has no money and whether his business is really going 
badly. 
 
§ 7.5 Rescheduling 
 
It is obvious that due to the financial crisis many microfinance institutions ran into difficulties. 
Because of the sharp increase in non-performing loans of members at the start of the crisis and 
afterwards, the microfinance institutions failed to meet their obligation. LPKM responded adequately 
to these growing difficulties by rescheduling the loans of the microfinance institutions with the most 
severe problems. Also the microfinance institutions felt that something had to be done and that 
rescheduling was one of the possibilities to solve these issues. Thus, they provided liquidity (breathing 
space) and prevented the microfinance institutions from taking hard measures. Rescheduling a loan 
means extending the loan term or changing the payment schedule or both. When a microfinance 
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institution is unable to repay a loan due to illness, natural disaster, mismanagement or crisis, it can also 
be possible to refinance the loan. Refinancing is generally more risky than rescheduling, and the 
assistor has to have financial resources for this health care support. In August of 1998LPKM decided 
to reschedule the loans of three microfinance institutions (Kopmaba, Bina Mitra Warga Bandung, and 
Bina Mitra Warga Sumedang).  
 
LPKM rescheduled the loans after the financial crisis as follows. The staff of LPKM first looked at the 
principal amount that was outstanding; next, the interest was calculated which the microfinance 
institution would have to pay if everything went according to plan. Then, these two amounts were 
added up together. Subsequently, the microfinance institution and LPKM would negotiate on the term 
and the amount that would be transferred monthly. This whole process would lead to a longer loan 
term without additional interest cost for the microfinance institutions. LPKM might consider levying 
an additional fee to make up for lost revenue on the loan due to the rescheduling, it is outstanding for a 
longer period and, therefore, should generate more revenue. Rachmanto, an employer at LPKM, said 
the reason that they do not charge additional interest is because this will have an adverse effect on the 
financial stability of the microfinance institutions. Charging extra interest would disturb and 
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Chapter 8 Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has tried to make a contribution to the literature on microfinance by providing an elaborate 
description and analysis of a relatively new microfinance programme. By examining the microfinance 
programme at the Parahyangan Catholic University Centre for Community Services, we tried to link 
adverse selection, moral hazard, auditing and enforcement problems, caused by asymmetric 
information, to the practice of microfinance. By scrutinising the theories concerning microfinance 
practices and empirical studies striking deviations were unveiled. In the process of achieving this goal 
we presented a thorough description of the microfinance programme initiated by LPKM. This once 
more emphasises that theory and practice can differ, and that the programme is unique allthough there 
are similarities with other microfinance programmes.  
 
First, we addressed the problems caused by asymmetric information. LPKM deals with this by making 
use of group lending contracts. While other microfinance programmes exploit group benefits for initial 
loans and small loan amounts, the institutions affiliated with LPKM use group solidarity and local 
information for loan amounts exceeding Rp. 15,000,000. Until now the group lending contracts are not 
impeccable, the appropriate design has still too be drafted. What is also rather striking is that they 
make emphatical use of meetings to obtain and distribute information in order to cope with moral 
hazard and adverse selection. To enforce repayment, LPKM and the microfinance institutions apply 
progressive lending and dynamic incentives. These mechanisms function reasonably well, but it is hard 
to judge how consistent LPKM executes its rules, since it is a relatively new programme and because 
of the financial crisis in 1998. The incentives that stem from these mechanisms depend heavily on how 
strictly the rules are enforced. LPKM must not be shallow to apply their rules. Badly performing 
institutions do not receive additional loans, but it is not unlikely that they will receive loans again in 
the future.  
 
Furthermore, we linked the literature on outreach and financial issues related to sustainability to this 
programme. While many other microfinance institutions aim at serving women for several reasons, the 
institutions affiliated with LPKM do not have a specific focus on women. Our research shows that 
LPKM does not reach the poorest segment of the community. LPKM and the microfinance institutions 
realise that they do not reach the poorest of poor, but try to develop the community and with it the 
local economy to alleviate mainly urban poverty. To meet the demand of their target group and to ease 
the process of lending to the less fortunate, more than financial services is provided. The fact that 
microfinance institutions make use of savings as a substantial source of funding indicates that the 
clients are indeed not the poorest people of Indonesia. The funding of LPKM depends on subsidies 
from all kind of sources, like an NGO in Canada, UNPAR, and the local government. LPKM and the 
microfinance institutions are therefore not financially sustainable. These providers of subsidies do not 
interfere with the activities and policy of LPKM but only demand a monthly financial report.  
 
The financial crisis of 1998 had a significant impact on the repayment performance of microfinance 
institutions and their members. The members could not repay their loans, and therefore many loans to 
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the microfinance institutions had to be rescheduled to prevent bankruptcy. The current situation of 
repayment by the affiliated microfinance institutions shows much diversity: while some have little 
difficulties to repay, others could not meet their financial obligations in the last few months. Due to 
this diversity LPKM started to strengthen the cohesion between the institutions, which resulted for 
example in a merger between two microfinance institutions. To ensure high repayment now and in the 
future LPKM makes extensive use of social intermediation. Social intermediation can best be 
understood as the process of building human and social capital required for sustainable financial 
intermediation with the poor. In addition, providing training such as entrepreneurship skills and social 
services such as health care, builds the human and social capital and can improve the ability of the 
poor to operate for instance their own small-scale enterprises. For LPKM the social intermediation is 
very important, because by building the human and social capital they hope the Indonesian people will 
learn to trust each other again.  
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Pertanyaan untuk anggota Lembaga Keuangan Mikro/Koperasi 
Questions for members of the Microfinance Institution 
 
 
1. Nama anda? (What is your name?) 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Jenis Kelamin? (What is your gender?) 
 Perempuan. (Female) 
 Laki-laki. (Male) 
 
3. Pekerjaan? (What is your occupation?) 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. Apakah anda sudah menikah? (Are you married?) 
 Ya. (Yes)  
 Tidak. (No) 
 
5. Jumlah anak? (How many children do you have?) 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
6. Bagaimana cara anda mencari informasi tentang lembaga keuangan micro/koperasi berserta 






7. Mengapa anda menjadi anggota lembaga keuangan micro/koperasi? (Why did you apply to the 
microfinance institute?) 
 Karena training yang diberikan oleh Lembaga Keuangan Micro/Koperasi? (For the 
training given by the microfinance institute.)  
 Karena kebutuhan untuk meminjam. (I needed the loan.) 
 Karena bunga/jasa yang kecil. (Because of the low interest.) 
 Karena tidak mendapatkan pinjaman dari tempat lain (dari Bank). (I cannot get a loan 
elsewhere (formal bank) 
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 Lain-lain (sebutkan), ………………………………….. (Other) 
 
8. Apa tujuan anda mengajukan permohonan pinjaman/kredit? (What was the original purpose of 
the loan you applied for?) 
 Untuk menjalankan usaha yang ada. (Money to run the existing 
business.) 
 Untuk memperluas usaha. (Money was needed to expand the existing 
business.) 
 Untuk memulai usaha baru. (Money was needed to start a business for 
the first time.) 
 Untuk biaya pengobatan. (Medical expenses.) 
 Untuk keperluan keluarga. (Expenditure related to family.) 
 Untuk upacara sosial (Sunatan, Perkawinan dll). (Social ceremonies.) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
9. Sebelumnya atau apakah anda pernah mendapatkan pinjaman bersama (kelompok)  dengan 
anggota lainnya? (In the past did you or do you get a loan together with other members?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak, silahkan lanjutkan dengan pertanyaan nomor 23 (No, continue 
at question number 23) 
 
10. Bila Ya, apakah anggota kelompok yang mendapat pinjaman tersebut adalah? (If yes, the people 
in your group are……..?) 
 Tergantung/relatif. (Relatives) 
 Teman. (Friends) 
 Orang lain (tidak kenal). (Strangers) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
11. Berapa jumlah anggota dalam satu kelompok (tanggung renteng)? (How many member are there 
in  your group?) 
 Dua orang. (2 people) 
 Tiga orang. (3 people) 
 Empat orang. (4 people) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
12. Apakah anda dapat memilih, siapa yang anggota dalam satu kelompok? (Could you choose the 
people with whom you formed a group?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
13. Bila anda membentuk kelompok, mengapa anggota tersebut yang anda pilih? (If you could form 
a group on your own, why did you chose these people?) 
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 Reputasinya baik. (They have a good reputation) 
 Sudah kenal cukup lama. (We get along well) 
 Tetangga. (We are neighbours) 
 Tidak tahu. (Do not know) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
14. Apakah ada jadwal pertemuan (tetap) bersama kelompok? (Does your group meet regularly?) 
 Ya. (Yes)  
 Tidak. (No) 
 
15. Apakah kelompok anda mempunyai peraturan? (Did your group make any rules?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 





17.  Apakah kelompok anda mempunyai tabungan? (Does your group have a savings scheme?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
18.  Apakah ada anggota kelompok anda yang mempunyai masalah dalam membayar cicilan? 
(Where there any members in your group who had problems repaying their instalment?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
19.  Bila ya, siapa yang membantu? (If yes, did they receive help from anybody?) 
 Saya sendiri. (From myself) 
 Anggota kelompok yang lain. (From somebody else from the group) 
 Kelompok secara ber sama-sama. (From the group as a whole) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………….. (Other) 
 
20.  Bantuan apa yang diberikan pada anggota kelompok tadi? (What kind of help  
was offered to this person?) 
 Bantuan keuangan. (Financial support) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),……………………….. (Other) 
 
21.  Sangsi apa yang digunakan kelompok untuk menghindarkan masalah tadi di kemudian hari? 
(What kinds of sanctions were used by the group to avoid problems in the future?) 
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22.  Siapa yang menegur anggota kelompok yang tidak dapat membayar cicilan? (Who addressed 
the person of the group when he could not pay the instalment?) 
 Saya sendiri. (I did) 
 Anggota kelompok lain. (Somebody else from the group did) 
 Kelompok secara bersama. (The group as a whole did) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
23. Sampai sejauhmanakah anda mengenal anggota lain dari lembaga keuangan micro/koperasi? 
(How well do you know the other members from the microfinance institution?) 
 Sangat baik (Very well) 
 Baik. (Good)  
 Kurang baik. (Not good) 
 Tidak mengenal. (Hardly) 
 
24. Apa saja yang suka dibicarakan dalam pertemuan/rapat? (What is discussed at the meetings?) 
 Laporan keuangan. (Financial report) 
 Peraturan-peraturan Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi. (Regulations) 
 Keterlambatan pembayaran angsuran. (People who are too late with 
their payment) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
25. Berapa nilai bunga/jasa perbulan tertinggi yang akan anda bayar? (What is the highest monthly 





26. Berapa nilai bunga/jasa perbulan tertinggi yang dapat anda bayar? (What is the highest monthly 



















29. Apakah anda suka membayar lebih jasa/bunga untuk jumlah pinjaman yang besar? (Would you 
be willing to pay more interest in exchange for a higher loan?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
30. Apakah anda mendapatkan pinjaman selain dari lembaga keuangan mikro/kopearsi? (Do you 
have outstanding loans anywhere else than at your microfinance institution?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
31. Bila anda mendapatkan pinjaman selain dari lembaga keuangan mikro/koperasi, dari mana 
sumber pinjaman tersebut? (If you have loans outstanding somewhere else, what is the source of 
these other loans?) 
 Keluarga. (Family)  
 Bank. (Formal bank) 
 Modal Ventura. (Venture capitalist) 
 Sumber informal. (Informal agent)  
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
32. Bilamana di tempat anda tidak ada lembaga keuangan mikro/koperasi, apakah anda tetap akan 
menjalankan program lembaga keuangan mikro/koperasi? (If  there was no microfinance 
programme, would you still undertake the project?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
33. Bilamana anda tetap menjalankan lembaga keuangan mikro/koperasi, apakah dalam lingkup 
kerja/program yang sama? (If you were to undertake the project anyway, would the scale be the 
same?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
34. Bilamana Ya, dari manakah anda mendapatkan dana bantuan? (If  yes, where would you get the 
funds from?)  
 Tabungan. (Savings) 
 Menjual kekayaan. (Sell property) 
 Meminjam dari sumber informal. (Borrow from informal sources) 
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 Meminjam dari Bank. (Borrow from formal bank) 
 Menjual barang dan meminjam. (Both sell product and borrow) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
35. Berapa jarak antara rumah anda dengan Lembaga Keuangan Mikro/koperasi? (What is the 





36. Apakah anda akan datang bilamana ada pelatihan yang diberikan oleh lembaga keuangan 
mikro/koperasi? (Do you go to the training provided by the microfinance institution?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
37. Kapan pelatihan tersebut diberikan oleh lembaga keuangan mikro/koperasi dan berapa lama 
waktu yang dibutuhkan untuk sebuah pelatihan, dalam hitungan menit? (When there is a training 





38. Bagaimana menurut anda berkaitan dengan ketepatan waktu pertemuan/rapat, dalam hitungan 




39. Apakah anda pernah mengalami keterlambatan membayar angsuran, minimal satu kali 
keterlambatan? (Did you have at least one late repayment in the past?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
40. Bila ya, apakah alasan yang anda berikan berkaitan dengan keterlambatan pembayaran tersebut? 
(If yes, what were the reasons for the late repayment?) 
 Bencana alam. (Natural disaster) 
 Kegagalan usaha. (Business failure) 
 Sakit. (Own illness) 
 Kematian anggota keluarga. (Death of family member) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
41. Apakah pengurus lembaga keuangan/koperasi akan datang ke rumah and/a bilamana anda tidak 
dapat membayar angsuran tepat waktu? (Did the staff of the institution come to you when you 
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could not repay the instalment?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
42. Bilamana anda terlambat membayar angsuran, apa yang lembaga keuangan/koperasi lakukan 
terhadap anda? (If you had a late payment, what did the microfinance institute do when you 
could not repay the instalment on time?) 
 Membuat perjanjian pinjaman baru. (Made a new loan agreement) 
 Tidak mendapatkan pijaman dimasa yang akan datang. (Banned me 
for further loans) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
43. Bilamana anda mendapatkan kesulitan membayar angsuran tepat waktu, usaha apa yang anda 
lakukan untuk mengatasi persoalan tersebut. (If you have trouble paying the instalment on time, 
what source do you use to make the repayment?) 
 Tabungan. (Savings) 
 Meminjam dari kaluarga atau kawan. (Borrowed from family or friends) 
 Menjual kekayaan. (Sold property) 
 Meminjam dari kelompok. (Borrowed from the group) 
 Meminjam dari anggota kelompok. (Borrowed from individual member) 
 Meminjam dari rentenir. (Borrowed from informal money lender) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
44. Sejauhmana kesulitan yang anda rasakan untuk membayar angsuran pada akhir bulan. (How 
difficult was it for you to make repayments in the past month)  
 Sangat sulit. (Very difficult) 
 Sedikit. (A little difficult) 
 Tidak sulit. (Not difficult) 
 
45. Pada saat anda mendapatkan kesulitan untuk membayar angsuran, maka jenis biaya hidup apa 
yang anda kurangi? (In the past when you had difficulty paying the instalment, what kind of 
expenditures did you reduce?) 
 Biaya makanan. (Food) 
 Biaya kebutuhan harian. (Daily) 
 Biaya pakaian. (Clothing) 
 Biaya pupuk dan pestisida. (Fertilizer and pesticide) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
46. Selama anda dalam bulan yang sulit, apakah anggota keluarga bekerja lebih? (During the most 
difficult month, did family members work more?)   
 Ya. (Yes) 
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47. Jenis usaha apa yang anda gunakan untuk membayar angsuran pinjaman? (What sources did 
you use for your loan repayment in the past month?)    
 Menjual hasil pertanian dan produk kebutuhan hidup. (Sold 
agriculture and livestock products) 
 Menjual barang. (Sold durable goods of production material) 
 Gaji. (Wage income) 
 Penghasilan pribadi. (Income from self-employment income) 
 Tunai. (Cash in hand) 
 Meminjam dari saudara/keluarga atau sumber informal lainnya. 
(Borrowed  from family (informal)) 
 Meminjam dari lembaga formal. (Borrowed elsewhere (formal)) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
48. Bilamana anda dapat membayar angsuran  tepat waktu, apakah menurut anda, anda akan 
mendapatkan pinjaman kembali? (If you pay all instalments on time do you think you can get 
another loan?)   
 Ya. Tentu. (Yes, definitely) 
 Mungkin Ya. (Probably) 
 Mungkin Tidak. (Probably not) 
 Tidak tahu. (Do not know) 
 
49. Bilamana anda selesai membayar keseluruhan pinjaman, apakah anda ingin mengajukan 
pinjaman kembali? (If you have already successfully repaid a loan, did you get another loan?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
50. Pernahkan anda mengajukan pinjaman, tetapi anda tidak mendaptkannya? (Has it ever happened 
in the past that you applied for a loan but did not get?) 
 Ya. (Yes)  
 Tidak. (No)  
 
51. Bila anda pernah mendapatkan pinjaman, apa alasan/dasar anda mengajukan pinjaman? (If you 




52. Jenis tenggang waktu pinjaman yang anda sukai? (What is the loan duration you prefer?) 
 Kurang dari atau sama dengan 3 bulan. (Less than 3 months) 
 Antara 4 dan 6 bulan. (4-6 months) 
 Antara 7 dan 12 bulan. (7-12 months) 
 Antara 13 dan 24 bulan. (13-24 months) 
 Lebih dari 25 bulan. (More than 25 months) 




53. Jenis pembayaran angsuran? (Preferred repayment frequency)  
 Mingguan (1 week) 
 Dua Mingguan (2 weeks)  
 Tiga Mingguan (3 weeks) 
 Bulanan (1 month) 
 Antara 1 dan 6 bulan. (Between 1 and 6 months)  
 Lebih dari 6 bulan. (More than 6 months) 
 
54. Jenis pertolongan/bantuan/pendampingan apa yang anda harapkan dari lembaga keuangan 
micro/koperasi selain pemberian pinjaman? (What kind of help do you receive from the 
institutions, besides loans?) 
 Pelatihan pembukuan. (Training book keeping skills) 
 Pelatihan manajemen/organisasi. (Training management 
organizational skills) 
 Pelatihan Kewirausahaan. (Entrepreneurship) 
 Keseluruhan yang disebutkan di atas. (All of the above) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan), …………………………………..(Other) 
 
55. Apakah anda berharap menerima pertolongan/bantuan/pendampingan tambahan dari lembaga 
keuangan mikro/koperasi? (Do you wish to receive more help from the institution?) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 
56. Bila Ya, jenis pertolongan/bantuan/pendapingan tambahan apa yang  anda harapkan? (If yes, 
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Appendix B Questionnaire form Staff Members 
of Microfinance institution 
 
 
PERTANYAAN UNTUK STAFF LEMBAGA KEUANGAN/KOPERASI  
(QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STAFF OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS) 
 
 
1. Apa nama Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi anda? (What is the name of your institution?) 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
2. Apakah posisi anda dalam lembaga tersebut? (What is your function at the 
institution?)……………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
3. Kapan Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi tersebut berdiri, sebutkan tanggal, bulan & tahun? (When 
did your institute began, what date?)……………………………………. 
 
4. Berapa jumlah anggota Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi pada saat ini? (How many members does 
your institute have at this moment?)……………………………………… 
 
5. Persoalan-persoalan organisasi dan persoalan-persoalan manajemen apa saja yang pernah 
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8. Bagaimana hak-hak anggota didistribusikan/diinformasikan diantara anggota dan bagaimana 
Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi didirikan? (How are the voting rights distributed among members, 






9. Siapa yang memutuskan topik yang akan dibicarakan dalam sebuah rapat? (Who decides the 
topics of voting at meetings?)  
 Pengurus Lembaga/Koperasi. (Staff) 
 Anggota Lembaga/Koperasi. (Members) 
 LPKM 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
10. Dalam pembicaraan/topik apa anggota Lembaga Keuangan/koperasi dilibatkan? (On what topics 





11. Bagaimana anggota menggunakan hak-haknya. (How are the votes of the members used?) 
 Rekomendasi. (Recommendation) 
 Obligasi. (Obligation) 
 Tidak digunakan. (Not used) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 






13. Faktor apa saja yang menjadi bahan pertimbangan bilamana anggota ingin mengajukan 
pinjaman? (Which factors do you take into consideration when a new member wants to apply for 
a loan?) 
 Proposal. (Business proposal) 
 Masukan dari anggota lainnya. (Opinion from other members) 
 Masukan dari tetangga. (Opinion from neighbours) 
 Wawasan dari anggota itu sendiri. (My own knowledge of the new 
member) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 




14. Pernahkah anggota mengajukan pinjaman, tetapi tidak mendapatkannya? (Has it ever occurred 
that a member who applied for a loan did not get the loan?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
15. Bilamana jawaban anda Ya, maka apa alasan yang anda berikan? (If yes, why did not the 




16. Apakah anda selalu memeriksa pinjaman yang diberikan telah sesuai dengan permohonan yang 
diajukan dalam proposal? (Do you check whether the members use the loan according to the 
business proposal?) 
 Kadang-kadang. (Sometimes) 
 Setiap kali. (Always) 
 Tidak pernah. (Never) 
  
17. Berapa jarak antara rumah anda dengan LPKM UNPAR, dalam kilometer?  (What is the 




18. Berapa rata-rata lamanya waktu rapat antara anda dengan LPKM UNPAR, dalam menit? (How 
long does the meeting between the staff of your institution and LPKM (UNPAR) normally take, 




19. Menurut anda, berapa lama waktu yang tepat/diperlukan untuk rapat/meeting dengan LPKM 
UNPAR, dalam hitungan menit? (What do you feel is the appropriate duration of  a meeting 
with LPKM (UNPAR), in minutes?) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
20. Berapa lama waktu yang dibutuhkan bilamana ada pertemuan antara anda dengan anggota, 
dalam hiungan menit? (How long does the meeting between the staff of your institution and your 
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21. Menurut anda, berapa lama waktu yang tepat/diperlukan untuk rapat/meeting bersama anggota, 
dalam hitungan menit? (What do you feel is the appropriate duration of a meeting with your 




22. Untuk jenis pekerjaan apa angsuran pinjaman dilakukan dengan cara pembayaran angsuran 






23. Untuk jenis pekerjaan apa angsuran pinjaman dilakukan dengan cara pembayaran angsuran 






24. Untuk jenis pekerjaan apa angsuran pinjaman dilakukan dengan cara pembayaran angsuran 





25. Apakah peminjam melakukan pembayaran cicilan dengan datang pada Lembaga Keuangan atau 
Koperasi? (Do borrowers bring the instalment to the institution?) 
 Ya. (Yes) 
 Tidak. (No) 
 
26. Seberapa seringkah anda menagih untuk pembayaran angsuran pada anggota baru? (How often 
do you collect the instalments for new members?) 
 Harian. (Daily) 
 Mingguan. (Weekly) 
 Bulanan. (Monthly) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
27. Siapa yang memutuskan seorang anggota mendapatkan pinjaman? (Who decides whether 
members receive a loan?) 
 Ketua Lembaga/Koperasi. (The head of the institution) 
 Seluruh staff Lembaga/Koperasi. (The complete staff of the institution) 
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 Anggota Lainnya. (The other members) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
28. Apa saja yang menjadi alasan peminjam bilamana tidak dapat membayar angsuran pada waktu 












30. Bilamana anda berkunjung pada para peminjam, topik apa saja yang biasanya dibicarakan? 






31. Berapa lama waktu yang dibutuhkan untuk pertemuan/pendampingan (kunjungan kerja) antara 
anda dengan peminjam, saat anda berkunjung pada anggota untuk menagih angsuran kepada 
anggota, dalam hitungan menit? (How long is the meeting between borrowers and the 




32. Bilamana pembayaran angsuran tidak tepat waktu, usaha apa saja yang dilakukan untuk 
mengetahui penyebab keterlambatan tersebut? (If the repayment is late, what sources do you 
check to find out the reason for the late payment?) 
 Bertanya pada peminjam. (I ask the member self) 
 Meminta informasi pada anggota lainnya. (I ask other members) 
 Meminta informasi pada beberapa anggota. (I ask relatives of the 
member) 
 Meminta informasi pada tetangga peminjam . (I ask the neighbours) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
33. Bilamana pembayaran angsuran tidak tepat waktu, apakah anda berkunjung pada anggota 
tersebut? (If the repayment is late, do you visit the members?) 
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 Kadang-kadang. (Sometimes) 
 Selalu. (Always) 
 Tidak pernah. (Never) 
 Anggota datang ke kantor Lembaga/Koperasi. (Members come to the 
institution) 
 
34. Apakah pernah terjadi anggota dapat membayar angsuran tetapi tidak membayar angsuran? (Has 
it ever happened that members can repay, but are not willing to repay?) 
 Tidak Pernah. (Never) 
 Seringkali. (Often). 
 Biasa terjadi. (Regularly) 
 
35. Apa saja yang menjadi sumber pembayaran angsuran para anggota, dan dari manakah sumber 
pembayaran angsuran para peminjam? (What are the sources of repayment; what money do the 
members use to repay the loans?)  
 Menjual hasil pertanian dan kebutuhan hidup. (They sell agriculture and livestock 
products) 
 Menjual barang. (They sell durable goods of  production material) 
 Gaji. (Wage income) 
 Penghasilan pribadi. (Self-employment income) 
 Tunai. (Cash)  
 Meminjam dari saudara atau teman. (They borrow from family or friends)  
 Meminjam di tempat lain. (They borrow elsewhere)  
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
36. Apakah anggota dapat menerima pinjaman baru bila seluruh anggota membayar angsuran tepat 
waktu? (Do members receive another loan when they make all the instalments on time?) 
 Ya (pasti). (Yes, definitely) 
 Mungkin. (Probably) 
 Tidak tahu. (Do not know) 
 
37. Bagaimana anda mengatasi para peminjam yang membayar angsurannya tidak tepat waktu, dan 
sangsi apa yang anda berikan terhadap para anggota yang terlambat membayar angsuran? (How 
do you deal with borrowers who are late, what sanctions do you use for borrowers that are late 






38. Jenis pembayaran apa yang lebih anda sukai, tetap atau menurun (berubah-ubah)? (Would you 
prefer the timing of repayment to be regular or to vary?) 
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 Tetap. (Regular) 
 Menurun (berubah-ubah). (Vary) 
 Tidak mempunyai pilihan. (No preference) 
 
39. Berapa jam dalam satu minggu anda bekerja untuk Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi? (How many 
hours do you work at the microfinance institute, per week?) 
 Antara 0 s/d 8 Jam. (0-8 hours) 
 Antara 9 s/d 16 Jam. (9-16 hours) 
 Antara 17 s/d 24 Jam. (17-24 hours) 
 Antara 25 s/d 32 Jam. (25-32 hours) 
 Antara 33 s/d 40 Jam. (33-40 hours) 
 Antara 41 s/d 48 Jam. (41-48 hours) 
 Lebih dari 49 Jam. (More than 49 hours) 
 
40. Apakah anda menerima insentif/gaji pada saat sekarang untuk perkerjaan anda di Lembaga 
Keuangan/Koperasi? (How are you rewarded for your work at the microfinance institute?) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi sebagai relawan. (No salary;  voluntary) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi dimasa yang akan datang saya berharap dapat  menerima gaji  tetap. 
(No salary, but in the future I will receive a fixed salary) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi dimasa yang akan datang saya berharap dapat menerima gaji 
berdasarkan perkembangan/kemampuan Lembaga Keuangan/ Koperasi.  (No salary, 
but in the future I will receive a salary based on the performance of my microfinance 
institute) 
 Gaji tetap didasarkan pada perkembangan/kemampuan Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi. 
(Fixed salary plus a salary based on the performance of my microfinance institute)  
 Gaji berdasarkan perkembangan/kemampuan dari Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi. 
(Salary based on the performance of my microfinance institute) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
41. Jenis penghargaan apa yang anda sukai untuk pekerjaan/aktivitas anda di Lembaga 
Keuangan/Koperasi? (How would you like to be rewarded for your work at the microfinance 
institute?) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi sebagai relawan. (No salary; voluntary) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi dimasa yang akan datang saya berharap dapat menerima gaji. (No 
salary, but in the future I would like to receive a fixed salary) 
 Tanpa gaji, tetapi dimasa yang akan datang saya berharap dapat menerima gaji 
berdasarkan perkembangan/kemampuan Lembaga Keuangan/ Koperasi. (No salary, but 
in the future I would like to receive a salary based on the performance of my 
microfinance institute) 
 Gaji yang jelas. (Fixed salary)  
 Gaji berdasarkan perkembangan/kemampuan dari Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi. 
(Salary based on the performance of my microfinance institute) 
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 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
42. Bantuan apa saja yang anda berikan pada anggota, selain pemberian pinjaman? (What kind of 
other services do you give to your members, besides loans?) 
 Tabungan. (Savings deposits) 
 Pelatihan pembukuan. (Training book keeping skills) 
 Pelatihan Manajemen/Organisasi. (Training management/organizational skills) 
 Pelatihan Kewirausahaan. (Entrepreneurship) 
 Semua yang disebutkan di atas. (All of the above) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 





44. Batuan apa saja yang anda terima dari LPKM, diluar pinjaman? (What kind of help do you 
receive from LPKM, besides loans?) 
 Pelatihan Pembukuan. (Training book keeping skills) 
 Pelatihan Manajemen/Organisasi. (Training management/organizational skills) 
 Pelatihan Kewirausahaan. (Entrepreneurship) 
 Semuanya yang disebutkan di atas. (All of the above) 
 Lain-lain (sebutkan),…………………………………… (Other) 
 
45. Apakah anda berharap dapat menerima jenis pertolongan/pendampingan yang lain dari LPKM? 
(Would you like to receive more help from LPKM?) 
 Tidak (No) 
 Ya (Yes) 
 
46. Bilamana jawaban anda Ya, maka jenis pertolongan/pendampingan apa yang anda harapkan dari 






47. Apakah anda mengumpulkan/mencari informasi dari anggota Lembaga Keuangan/Koperasi 
tentang? (Do you gather information from your members about?) 
 Peningkatan pemasukan anggota Lembaga/Koperasi. (Increased income of members) 
 Ekspansi bisnis/investasi bisnis. (Expansion of the business (investments in the 
business) 
 Peningkatan kekayaan. (Increased wealth) 
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 Peningkatan daya beli. (Increased consumption) 
 Peningkatan pendidikan dan gizi anak-anak anggota Lembaga/Koperasi. (Members 
children receive more education/nutrition.) 
 Increased self esteem 
 Menabung. (Savings) 
 Peningkatan kemampuan bisnis (pembukuan, manajemen, dll.). (Increased business 
skills (book keeping, management, et cetera) 
 
 
TERIMA KASIH ATAS KERJASAMANYA. 
(THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION). 
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Appendix C Funding 
 
Table C.I  financial source 
Financial source (amounts in Rupiah)  
Foundation of UNPAR, Pencairan  50,000,000 
Foundation of UNPAR, Pencairan - 20 July 1998 30,000,000 
Collaboration with local government - Jawa Barat 2,615,450 
Vice Rektor III 2,500,000 
Teacher of Architecture, 14 May 1998 3,500,000 
Teacher of Architecture, 7 August 1998 3,500,000 
Ibu Elsye (teacher at Economic Faculty UNPAR) 500,000 
Bpk. Korniatmanto (teacher at Law Faculty UNPAR) 666,400 
Collaboration with local government I 21,891,727 
Ibu Benny Soeprapto 2,500,000 
Collaboration with local government for area development 15,000,000 
Charity NGO, Canada, CIDA 3,120,000 
Collaboration with local government for research issues 10,190,452 
Loan from university (outstanding amount) 20,000,000 
Grand from local government (Bapede: Program Kejasama Pelatihann).   15,128,020 
Bank account (Dapen) 2,190,000 
Source: LPKM 
 
The amounts listed in Table C.I are the amounts given in the past by the people and the 
organisations. Hence, it is not the amount outstanding, except for the loan from the university. 
Since LPKM had not enough liquidity, they asked the university for funding in order to 
prevent problems with payments. The interest rate on this loan is 0 per cent, with a loan term 
of four months. In the past LPKM did research and gave information to the local government 
on area development, empowerment of people, capitalism, local leadership, liberalism, and 
microfinance. Therefore, the local government passed a part of their budget to LPKM. 
 
Dana Pendidikan (Dapen) requires specific attention. This is an account that belongs to 
Rismansyah and Rachmanto (two employees at LPKM). The money they receive from 
activities (e.g. when they are hired by the International Labour Organisation to arrange a 
workshop or lectures to students about empowerment of people) outside their normal job 
description is put into this account. When LPKM does not have enough financial resources 
and the microfinance institutions hand in a good loan proposal, this account can serve as a 
lender of last resort. No interest rate is charged for loans from this account. The initial purpose 
of this account however is to finance the personal education needs of the staff of the 
microfinance institutions. The education can be very broad since there are no criteria used 
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when appealing to this account, even an education that has nothing in common with running a 
microfinance institution can be financed from this source. The borrower bears full 
responsibility for the personal loan, the microfinance institution is never liable for the loan 
(LPKM can never call upon the capital of the microfinance institution to recover the loan). In 
case the staff member defaults, the salary earned at the microfinance institution will be 
directly transferred to the Dapen account.    
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Appendix D Repayment 
 
To determine repayment performance there are many useful indicators from which a choice can be 
made. However, the choice of an indicator depends among other things on the objective of the user. 
The reason why we presented the repayment rates of the microfinance institutions is that it is 
reasonable to expect a relation between the financial performance and the success of the microfinance 
institutions to adhere to the established micro credit principles. We calculated the repayment rate using 




Repayment rates using this formula cannot be higher than 100 per cent. This formula removes the 
effect of prepayments and shows the actual rate of received payments against expected payments on 
time and takes into account past due amounts. Therefore, this formula provides useful information on 


























due + past due – 
prepayments 
           
May/June/July 3,210 2,385 945 0 2,564 1,058 520 217 1,200 173 351 
Aug/Sept/Oct 5,933 712 945 726 2,165 1,544 346 651 1,036 173 1,045 
Nov/Dec/Jan 6,975 1,041 1,891 1,089 1,308 2,532 693 651 349 0 1,479 
Feb/March/April 4,733 1,719 1,891 1,089 0 5,602 519 1,171 0 0 1,102 
            
Current amounts 
due 
           
May/June/July 3,210 3,485 945 0 2,651 1,058 520 217 900 346 351 
Aug/Sept/Oct 5,933 1,812 945 726 4,471 1,838 520 651 1,685 520 1,045 
Nov/Dec/Jan 7,353 1,916 1,891 1,089 4,683 3,356 520 651 1,947 520 1,479 
Feb/March/April 7,224 2,619 1,891 1,089 3,949 4,310 519 1,171 1,947 520 1,870 
            
Past due amounts            
May/June/July 0 50 0 0 582 0 0 0 300 0 0 
Aug/Sept/Oct 0 1,150 0 0 668 0 0 0 0 173 0 
Nov/Dec/Jan 0 2,250 0 0 2,887 294 173 0 349 521 0 
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